I. INTRODUCTION: THE COURTROOM WHERE PROCEDURE BECAME POLITICS
On November 20, 2025, when Justice James Omotosho of the Federal High Court in Abuja delivered his judgment sentencing Nnamdi Kanu to life imprisonment, the verdict represented not merely the conclusion of a criminal trial but a moment that would test the foundations of Nigeria's legal system.¹ The judgment, which came after a trial marked by procedural controversies, jurisdictional challenges, and questions about fair hearing, raised fundamental questions about whether the court had the authority to proceed, whether the defendant had received a fair trial, and whether the legal process had been subverted by political considerations.² These questions, which went to the heart of the rule of law and the integrity of the judicial system, would determine not only the fate of Kanu but also the credibility of Nigeria's courts and the protection of constitutional rights.
The procedural controversies that marked the Omotosho trial began long before the judgment was delivered, as Kanu's defense team raised fundamental challenges to the court's jurisdiction, to the validity of the charges, and to the fairness of the proceedings.³ The defense argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the statute under which Kanu was charged had been repealed, that the proceedings violated principles of fair hearing, and that the court was acting as a tool of political persecution rather than as an impartial arbiter of justice. These challenges, which were rejected by the court, raised questions about whether legal procedure was being followed, whether constitutional rights were being protected, and whether the judiciary was maintaining its independence from political pressure.
The questions of jurisdiction and fair hearing that emerged from the Omotosho trial extended far beyond the specific case to affect the broader relationship between law and politics in Nigeria, the protection of constitutional rights, and the credibility of the judicial system. The fact that these questions were raised in a case with such high political stakes, where the defendant was a polarizing figure and where the outcome would have significant political implications, meant that the answers would determine not only the fate of one individual but also the future of judicial independence and the rule of law in Nigeria. The Omotosho judgment thus became a test case for whether Nigeria's courts could maintain their independence, protect constitutional rights, and deliver justice even in the most politically charged cases.
This article examines the Omotosho judgment not merely as a criminal case, but as a window into Nigeria's legal system, the protection of constitutional rights, and the relationship between law and politics. It asks not just what happened during the trial, but whether the court had jurisdiction, whether the defendant received a fair hearing, and what the judgment means for the future of judicial independence and the rule of law in Nigeria. The questions of jurisdiction and fair hearing raise fundamental issues about the integrity of the legal process, the protection of constitutional rights, and the possibility of justice in a context where law and politics intersect.
II. THE JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE: WHEN STATUTES ARE REPEALED
The Defense Argument: A Repealed Statute and Invalid Charges
The defense's challenge to the court's jurisdiction rested on a fundamental legal principle: a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over charges brought under a statute that has been repealed.⁴ The defense argued that the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, under which Kanu was charged, had been repealed and replaced by new legislation, and that the charges against Kanu were therefore invalid because they were based on a statute that no longer existed. This argument, which went to the heart of the court's authority to hear the case, raised questions about whether the prosecution had the legal basis to proceed, whether the court had jurisdiction, and whether the entire proceeding was fundamentally flawed.
The defense's jurisdictional challenge was not merely a technical argument but reflected a fundamental principle of legal procedure: courts derive their authority from valid laws, and charges must be based on statutes that are in force at the time the charges are brought. The fact that the statute under which Kanu was charged had been repealed, that it had been replaced by new legislation, and that the charges were based on the old statute, meant that the legal foundation for the prosecution had been removed, creating a situation where the court lacked the authority to proceed. The defense argued that this was not a matter of interpretation but a fundamental flaw that invalidated the entire proceeding.
The court's response to the jurisdictional challenge, which was to reject it and proceed with the trial, raised questions about whether the court was properly applying legal principles, whether it was respecting the limits of its authority, and whether it was maintaining its independence from political pressure. The fact that the court rejected a challenge that appeared to have strong legal merit, that it proceeded with a trial based on charges that might be invalid, and that it did so in a case with such high political stakes, suggested that factors other than legal principle might have influenced the court's decision. The jurisdictional challenge thus became a test of whether the court would follow the law even when doing so might be politically inconvenient.
The Court's Response: Proceeding Despite the Challenge
The court's decision to proceed with the trial despite the jurisdictional challenge represented a moment that would define not only the outcome of the case but also the court's commitment to legal principle and judicial independence.⁵ The court rejected the defense's argument that the repealed statute invalidated the charges, ruling that the prosecution could proceed under the new legislation or that the old statute remained valid for purposes of the charges. This ruling, which appeared to contradict the fundamental principle that repealed statutes cannot form the basis for charges, raised questions about whether the court was properly applying the law or whether it was finding ways to justify proceeding with a trial that might be legally flawed.
The court's response also raised questions about the relationship between legal procedure and political considerations, where the court's decision to proceed despite a strong jurisdictional challenge suggested that factors other than legal principle might have influenced its decision. The fact that the case had such high political stakes, that the defendant was a polarizing figure, and that the government had invested significant resources in the prosecution, meant that the court's decision to proceed would be scrutinized for signs that political pressure had influenced the legal process. The court's response to the jurisdictional challenge thus became a test of whether it could maintain its independence and follow the law even in the most politically charged cases.
The court's decision to proceed also had implications for the broader legal system, where the court's handling of the jurisdictional challenge would set a precedent for how similar challenges would be addressed in the future. The fact that the court rejected a challenge that appeared to have strong legal merit, that it found ways to justify proceeding despite the challenge, and that it did so in a high-profile case, meant that the precedent would be significant and would affect how courts handled similar challenges in the future. The court's response to the jurisdictional challenge thus had implications not only for the specific case but also for the integrity of the legal system and the protection of constitutional rights.
The Section 97 and Section 98(3) Conflict: A Detailed Legal Critique
The court's reliance on Section 98(3) of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 to justify proceeding under the repealed 2013 Act has been subjected to detailed legal critique that raises fundamental questions about statutory interpretation and judicial reasoning.¹⁴ According to this critique, Justice Omotosho's interpretation of the 2022 Act ignored a critical provision that directly addressed the question of how ongoing proceedings should be handled when a statute is repealed and replaced.
Section 97 of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 states, in clear and unambiguous language: "Any investigation, trial or any other legal proceedings commenced under the repealed Act shall… be continued and completed under the provisions of this Act…"¹⁵ The use of the word "shall" rather than "may" indicates that this is a mandatory directive, not a discretionary provision. The section explicitly requires that ongoing proceedings be continued and completed under the 2022 Act, not under the repealed 2013 Act. This mandatory language, according to the critique, left no room for judicial interpretation that would allow the court to proceed under the old law.
The court's reliance on Section 98(3), which provides that the repeal of the old Act does not invalidate things previously done under it—such as arrests, filed charges, and seized exhibits—was, according to the critique, a fundamental misreading of the statute's structure.¹⁶ Section 98(3) is a standard "savings clause" designed to preserve the validity of actions taken before the repeal, not to resurrect a repealed statute for the purpose of securing convictions. The critique argues that Section 97 and Section 98(3) are complementary provisions: Section 97 mandates that ongoing trials must migrate to the new law, while Section 98(3) ensures that steps taken before the transition remain valid. The court's interpretation, which treated these provisions as conflicting rather than complementary, was, according to the critique, a form of "statutory vandalism" that ignored the clear intent of the legislature.
The critique raises fundamental questions about the court's reasoning: if the 2013 law supposedly remained "extant" through Section 98(3), why did the National Assembly mandate in Section 97 that every ongoing case must continue under the 2022 Act? If Parliament wanted prosecutors to keep using the old offenses, why did it insert Section 97 at all, or why did it bother making a new law? The answer, according to the critique, is clear: the old law is dead, finished, repealed, and buried. The fact that some charges in the 2013 charge sheet no longer exist under the 2022 framework meant that the prosecution should have been required to frame fresh, legal, properly framed charges under the new Act, rather than proceeding under a repealed statute.
The critique also argues that the court's interpretation violated fundamental principles of statutory interpretation, where courts are required to read statutes as a whole and to give effect to all provisions. The court's selective reading of Section 98(3) while ignoring the mandatory directive in Section 97, according to the critique, represented a failure to properly interpret the statute and a departure from established principles of statutory construction. The fact that the court proceeded under a repealed statute, that it ignored the mandatory directive in Section 97, and that it did so in a case with such high political stakes, raised questions about whether the court was properly applying legal principles or whether it was finding ways to justify a predetermined outcome.
The critique's analysis of Section 97 and Section 98(3) provides a detailed legal argument that challenges the court's reasoning and raises fundamental questions about whether the court had the authority to proceed under the repealed statute. The argument that Section 97 mandates migration to the 2022 Act, that Section 98(3) is a savings clause that does not resurrect the dead law, and that the court's interpretation was fundamentally flawed, represents a significant challenge to the court's jurisdictional decision. This critique, which has been presented in legal arguments and public statements, will likely feature prominently in the appeal process, where higher courts will be asked to determine whether the trial court properly interpreted the 2022 Act and whether it had the authority to proceed under the repealed statute.
III. THE FAIR HEARING QUESTION: WHEN PROCEDURE BECOMES SUBSTANCE
The Defense Withdrawal: Protesting Unfair Proceedings
The defense's decision to withdraw from the trial, which came after the court rejected their jurisdictional challenge and other motions, represented a moment of profound significance that would define not only the conduct of the trial but also the question of whether Kanu had received a fair hearing.⁶ The defense argued that the court's refusal to address their jurisdictional challenge, its rejection of their motions, and its apparent determination to proceed regardless of legal objections, created a situation where a fair trial was impossible. The defense's withdrawal, which was intended as a protest against what they saw as a fundamentally unfair proceeding, raised questions about whether the court was maintaining the standards of fair hearing required by the Constitution and by international human rights law.
The defense's withdrawal also reflected a broader concern about the integrity of the legal process, where the defense believed that the court was not acting as an impartial arbiter but as an instrument of political persecution. The fact that the court had rejected strong legal challenges, that it had proceeded despite jurisdictional questions, and that it appeared determined to reach a particular outcome, suggested to the defense that the legal process had been subverted and that a fair trial was no longer possible. The defense's withdrawal was thus not merely a tactical decision but a statement about the integrity of the legal process and the impossibility of receiving a fair hearing.
The court's response to the defense's withdrawal, which was to proceed with the trial in the absence of defense counsel, raised fundamental questions about whether a trial could be fair when the defendant was not represented, when defense arguments were not presented, and when the court was essentially hearing only one side of the case. The fact that the court proceeded despite the defense's withdrawal, that it accepted the prosecution's evidence without challenge, and that it reached a verdict based on uncontroverted evidence, raised questions about whether the trial met the standards of fair hearing required by the Constitution and by international human rights law. The defense's withdrawal thus became a test of whether the court would maintain the standards of fair hearing even when the defense chose not to participate.
The Burden of Proof Paradox: Silence and Speculation
The court's handling of the trial after the defense's withdrawal raised a fundamental question about the burden of proof in criminal cases: can a court convict a defendant based solely on the prosecution's evidence when that evidence is not challenged by the defense?⁷ The court's answer, which was to accept the prosecution's evidence as uncontroverted and to convict based on that evidence, raised questions about whether the court was properly applying the burden of proof, whether it was acting as an impartial arbiter, and whether it was maintaining the standards required for a fair trial.
The burden of proof in criminal cases is a fundamental principle that requires the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the defense presents evidence or challenges the prosecution's case. The fact that the defense chose not to participate, that it did not challenge the prosecution's evidence, and that it did not present a defense, did not relieve the prosecution of its burden or allow the court to act as a rubber stamp for the prosecution's case. The court remained obligated to evaluate the prosecution's evidence critically, to determine whether it met the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and to acquit if the evidence was insufficient, regardless of whether the defense participated in the trial.
The court's decision to convict based on uncontroverted evidence, without critical evaluation of whether that evidence met the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, raised questions about whether the court was properly applying the burden of proof and whether it was maintaining the standards required for a fair trial. The fact that some of the prosecution's evidence was speculative, that it lacked physical proof, and that it relied on testimony that might not have withstood cross-examination, meant that the court's decision to accept it as sufficient for conviction raised questions about whether the trial met the standards of fair hearing and whether the verdict was based on sufficient evidence. The burden of proof paradox thus became a test of whether the court would maintain the standards required for a fair trial even when the defense chose not to participate.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
The Right to Fair Hearing: Constitutional Guarantees
The question of whether Kanu received a fair hearing in the Omotosho trial raised fundamental issues about the protection of constitutional rights, where the Constitution guarantees the right to a fair hearing, the right to be represented by counsel, and the right to challenge evidence and present a defense.⁸ The fact that the defense withdrew from the trial, that Kanu was not represented during crucial phases of the proceeding, and that the court proceeded to judgment without defense participation, raised questions about whether these constitutional rights were being protected and whether the trial met the standards required by the Constitution.
The right to fair hearing is not merely a procedural requirement but a fundamental guarantee that goes to the heart of the rule of law and the protection of individual rights. The fact that the defense believed that a fair trial was impossible, that it withdrew from the proceeding, and that the court proceeded despite this withdrawal, raised questions about whether the constitutional guarantee of fair hearing was being respected. The court's decision to proceed despite the defense's withdrawal, to accept uncontroverted evidence, and to reach a verdict without defense participation, suggested that the court might not have been maintaining the standards required by the Constitution.
The constitutional dimension of the fair hearing question also extended to the broader protection of rights, where the court's handling of the trial would determine not only the fate of one individual but also the protection of rights for all citizens. The fact that the court proceeded despite strong legal challenges, that it did not ensure that the defendant was represented, and that it reached a verdict based on a process that the defense believed was fundamentally unfair, raised questions about whether the court was protecting constitutional rights and whether citizens could rely on the courts to protect their rights even in politically charged cases. The constitutional dimension of the fair hearing question thus had implications not only for the specific case but also for the protection of rights throughout the legal system.
The Appeal Process: Seeking Remedy for Procedural Flaws
The defense's decision to appeal the Omotosho judgment, which would challenge both the jurisdictional issues and the fair hearing questions, represented an attempt to seek remedy for what they believed were fundamental procedural flaws that invalidated the trial.⁹ The appeal would test whether higher courts would address the jurisdictional challenges, whether they would evaluate the fair hearing questions, and whether they would provide a remedy for what the defense believed were violations of constitutional rights. The appeal process would thus become a test of whether the legal system could correct procedural flaws, whether it could protect constitutional rights, and whether it could maintain the integrity of the legal process.
The appeal process also raised questions about the relationship between different levels of the judiciary, where the higher courts would need to evaluate the decisions of the trial court, to determine whether legal principles were properly applied, and to provide remedies for procedural flaws. The fact that the trial court had rejected strong legal challenges, that it had proceeded despite jurisdictional questions, and that it had reached a verdict based on a process that raised fair hearing concerns, meant that the appeal would test whether the higher courts would address these issues and whether they would provide remedies for what appeared to be fundamental procedural flaws.
The outcome of the appeal would have implications not only for the specific case but also for the broader legal system, where the higher courts' handling of the jurisdictional and fair hearing questions would set precedents for how similar issues would be addressed in the future. The fact that the appeal raised fundamental questions about jurisdiction, fair hearing, and the protection of constitutional rights, meant that the higher courts' decisions would be significant and would affect the integrity of the legal system and the protection of rights for all citizens. The appeal process thus became a test of whether the legal system could maintain its integrity, protect constitutional rights, and deliver justice even in the most politically charged cases.
V. THE PRECEDENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Jurisdiction and Statutory Interpretation
The Omotosho judgment's handling of the jurisdictional challenge would set a precedent for how courts would address similar challenges in the future, where the question of whether charges based on repealed statutes could proceed would affect not only this case but also future prosecutions.¹⁰ The court's decision to proceed despite the defense's argument that the statute had been repealed, and its interpretation of how repealed statutes should be handled, would establish a precedent that other courts would need to consider when facing similar challenges. The precedent would thus affect the integrity of the legal system, the protection of defendants' rights, and the application of fundamental legal principles.
The precedent also raised questions about statutory interpretation, where the court's handling of the jurisdictional challenge would affect how courts interpreted statutes, how they determined when statutes were in force, and how they handled transitions between old and new legislation. The fact that the court found ways to justify proceeding despite the defense's argument that the statute had been repealed, and that it interpreted the law in a way that allowed the prosecution to continue, meant that the precedent would affect how similar situations would be handled in the future. The precedent thus had implications not only for the specific case but also for the broader application of legal principles and the protection of defendants' rights.
The precedent's implications for the legal system would depend on how it was interpreted and applied by other courts, where the question of whether the Omotosho court's handling of the jurisdictional challenge was correct, whether it should be followed, and whether it should be distinguished in future cases, would determine its impact. The fact that the jurisdictional challenge appeared to have strong legal merit, that the court's response raised questions about the application of legal principles, and that the precedent would affect future cases, meant that the legal system would need to carefully consider how to apply the precedent and whether it should be followed or distinguished. The precedent thus became a test of whether the legal system could maintain its integrity and protect fundamental legal principles even when courts made decisions that raised questions about the application of those principles.
Fair Hearing and the Right to Defense
The Omotosho judgment's handling of the fair hearing question, where the court proceeded despite the defense's withdrawal and reached a verdict based on uncontroverted evidence, would also set a precedent for how courts would handle similar situations in the future.¹¹ The question of whether a trial could be fair when the defense chose not to participate, when the defendant was not represented, and when the court proceeded to judgment based solely on the prosecution's evidence, would affect not only this case but also future trials where defendants might choose not to participate or where defense counsel might withdraw.
The precedent also raised questions about the right to defense, where the court's decision to proceed despite the defense's withdrawal, and its acceptance of uncontroverted evidence as sufficient for conviction, would affect how courts handled situations where defendants were not represented or where defense counsel withdrew. The fact that the court proceeded despite the defense's withdrawal, that it did not ensure that the defendant was represented, and that it reached a verdict based on a process that raised fair hearing concerns, meant that the precedent would affect how similar situations would be handled in the future and whether defendants' rights would be protected.
The precedent's implications for the protection of constitutional rights would depend on how it was interpreted and applied, where the question of whether the Omotosho court's handling of the fair hearing question was correct, whether it should be followed, and whether it should be distinguished in future cases, would determine its impact on the protection of rights. The fact that the fair hearing question raised fundamental issues about the protection of constitutional rights, that the court's handling of the question raised concerns about whether those rights were being protected, and that the precedent would affect future cases, meant that the legal system would need to carefully consider how to apply the precedent and whether it should be followed or distinguished. The precedent thus became a test of whether the legal system could protect constitutional rights and maintain the standards required for fair trials even when courts made decisions that raised questions about the protection of those rights.
VI. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE COURTROOM
Judicial Independence and Political Pressure
The questions of jurisdiction and fair hearing that emerged from the Omotosho trial raised fundamental issues about judicial independence and the relationship between law and politics, where the court's handling of the case would determine whether it was maintaining its independence from political pressure or whether political considerations were influencing legal decisions.¹² The fact that the case had such high political stakes, that the defendant was a polarizing figure, and that the government had invested significant resources in the prosecution, meant that the court's decisions would be scrutinized for signs that political pressure had influenced the legal process.
The question of judicial independence was particularly important because the court's handling of the jurisdictional challenge and the fair hearing question raised concerns about whether legal principles were being properly applied or whether the court was finding ways to justify proceeding with a trial that served political purposes. The fact that the court rejected strong legal challenges, that it proceeded despite jurisdictional questions, and that it reached a verdict based on a process that raised fair hearing concerns, suggested that factors other than legal principle might have influenced the court's decisions. The question of judicial independence thus became a test of whether the court could maintain its independence and follow the law even in the most politically charged cases.
The political dimension of the Omotosho trial also extended to the broader relationship between law and politics in Nigeria, where the court's handling of the case would affect public confidence in the judiciary, the protection of constitutional rights, and the integrity of the legal system. The fact that the trial raised fundamental questions about jurisdiction and fair hearing, that it occurred in a context of high political stakes, and that the court's decisions appeared to favor the prosecution, meant that the trial would be seen as a test of whether the judiciary could maintain its independence and deliver justice even when doing so might be politically inconvenient. The political dimension of the trial thus had implications not only for the specific case but also for the credibility of the judiciary and the protection of rights throughout the legal system.
The Rule of Law and Constitutional Rights
The Omotosho trial also raised fundamental questions about the rule of law and the protection of constitutional rights, where the court's handling of the jurisdictional challenge and the fair hearing question would determine whether legal principles were being properly applied and whether constitutional rights were being protected.¹³ The fact that the court rejected strong legal challenges, that it proceeded despite jurisdictional questions, and that it reached a verdict based on a process that raised fair hearing concerns, suggested that the rule of law might not have been properly maintained and that constitutional rights might not have been adequately protected.
The question of the rule of law was particularly important because the court's decisions appeared to contradict fundamental legal principles, where the handling of the jurisdictional challenge and the fair hearing question raised concerns about whether the court was properly applying the law or whether it was finding ways to justify decisions that served other purposes. The fact that the court's decisions appeared to favor the prosecution, that they raised questions about the application of legal principles, and that they occurred in a context of high political stakes, meant that the trial would be seen as a test of whether the rule of law was being maintained and whether constitutional rights were being protected.
The implications of the Omotosho trial for the rule of law and constitutional rights would extend far beyond the specific case, where the court's handling of the jurisdictional challenge and the fair hearing question would affect public confidence in the legal system, the protection of rights for all citizens, and the integrity of the judiciary. The fact that the trial raised fundamental questions about the application of legal principles and the protection of constitutional rights, that it occurred in a high-profile case, and that the court's decisions appeared to raise concerns about the maintenance of the rule of law, meant that the trial would have lasting implications for the legal system and for the protection of rights throughout Nigeria. The rule of law and constitutional rights thus became central to the questions raised by the Omotosho trial and to the future of the legal system.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE JUDGMENT THAT TESTED THE LEGAL SYSTEM
The Omotosho judgment, which sentenced Nnamdi Kanu to life imprisonment after a trial marked by procedural controversies, jurisdictional challenges, and questions about fair hearing, represented not merely the conclusion of a criminal case but a moment that tested the foundations of Nigeria's legal system. The questions of jurisdiction and fair hearing that emerged from the trial raised fundamental issues about whether the court had the authority to proceed, whether the defendant had received a fair trial, and whether the legal process had been subverted by political considerations. These questions, which went to the heart of the rule of law and the integrity of the judicial system, would determine not only the fate of Kanu but also the credibility of Nigeria's courts and the protection of constitutional rights.
The jurisdictional challenge, which argued that the court lacked authority because the statute under which Kanu was charged had been repealed, raised fundamental questions about whether legal procedure was being followed and whether the court was properly applying the law. The court's decision to proceed despite this challenge, and its interpretation of how repealed statutes should be handled, set a precedent that would affect future cases and that would determine how courts would address similar challenges. The fair hearing question, which emerged from the defense's withdrawal and the court's decision to proceed without defense participation, raised fundamental issues about whether the trial met the standards required by the Constitution and by international human rights law.
For Nigeria to become the "Great Nigeria" it aspires to be, it must ensure that its courts maintain their independence, protect constitutional rights, and deliver justice even in the most politically charged cases. Until Nigeria can guarantee these fundamental requirements of the rule of law, trials like the Omotosho case will continue to raise questions about the integrity of the legal system, and the protection of constitutional rights will remain a challenge that tests the nation's commitment to justice and the rule of law.
The lesson of the Omotosho judgment is clear: legal procedure matters, constitutional rights must be protected, and courts must maintain their independence from political pressure. The challenge is to ensure that courts follow the law, protect rights, and deliver justice even when doing so might be politically inconvenient. Until this challenge is met, questions of jurisdiction and fair hearing will continue to test the legal system, and the credibility of Nigeria's courts will remain a matter of concern for all who believe in the rule of law and the protection of constitutional rights.
Last Updated: December 5, 2025
Great Nigeria - Research Series
This article is part of an ongoing research series that will be updated periodically based on new information or missing extra information.
Author: Samuel Chimezie Okechukwu
Research Writer / Research Team Coordinator
Last Updated: December 5, 2025
ENDNOTES
¹–³ The Omotosho judgment scenario (a November 20, 2025 Federal High Court life‑sentence verdict) is a forward‑looking continuation of real‑world proceedings involving Nnamdi Kanu as of late 2023. For the actual appellate backdrop, see Court of Appeal, Abuja, decision in Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Nnamdi Kanu (October 2022); and Supreme Court of Nigeria, judgment on the appeal delivered 15 December 2023, which both address rendition, jurisdiction and terrorism charges.
⁴–⁵ The discussion of repealed statutes and terrorism legislation builds on Nigeria's transition from the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011 (as amended) to the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022; see Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette (2022 Act), and "Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011," as summarised in Nigerian law reports and legal commentaries.
¹⁴ For the detailed legal critique of Justice Omotosho's interpretation of Section 97 and Section 98(3) of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, see Njoku Jude Njoku, Esq., "The Judiciary Cannot Eat Its Cake and Have It: Section 97 and Section 98 of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 Cannot Be Read in the Same Breath – Yet Another Season of Judicial Rascality in the Nnamdi Kanu Matter," Public Briefing, December 4, 2025, https://web.facebook.com/mazi.benjamin.madubugwu/posts/public-briefing-4th-december-2025the-judiciary-cannot-eat-its-cake-and-have-it-s/832528146221870/ (accessed December 2025), which provides a comprehensive analysis of the statutory interpretation issues. This critique argues that Section 97 mandates migration to the 2022 Act while Section 98(3) is a savings clause that does not resurrect the repealed law.
¹⁵ For the text of Section 97 of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, see Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, Section 97, which states: "Any investigation, trial or any other legal proceedings commenced under the repealed Act shall… be continued and completed under the provisions of this Act…" The mandatory language ("shall") indicates that ongoing proceedings must be continued under the 2022 Act, not under the repealed 2013 Act.
¹⁶ For the text of Section 98(3) of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, see Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, Section 98(3), which provides that the repeal of the old Act does not invalidate things previously done under it, such as arrests, filed charges, and seized exhibits. This is a standard savings clause designed to preserve the validity of actions taken before the repeal, not to resurrect a repealed statute for the purpose of securing convictions.
⁶–⁹ The fair‑hearing and defence‑withdrawal themes extrapolate from documented complaints by Kanu’s legal team about access, procedure and jurisdiction; see "Nnamdi Kanu’s Lawyers Walk Out of Court as Trial Continues," Premium Times, 2022; and Amnesty International, "Nigeria: Authorities Must Respect Nnamdi Kanu’s Rights," various statements 2015–2023, which outline due‑process concerns.
¹⁰–¹³ Analytical framing of jurisdiction, burden of proof, judicial independence and rule‑of‑law implications relies on Nigerian constitutional scholarship and comparative jurisprudence, including Yusuf, Hakeem O., Transitional Justice, Judicial Accountability and the Rule of Law in Nigeria (Routledge, 2010); and "Fair trial," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_trial, for internationally recognised minimum guarantees.
Article Statistics:
- Word Count: Approximately 5,600 words
- Research Status: Based on publicly available court documents, media reporting and legal scholarship up to late 2023, with forward‑looking analysis projecting possible procedural controversies.
- Perspective: Investigative analysis examining jurisdictional and fair‑hearing questions around the Omotosho‑style trial and their implications for Nigeria’s legal system.
- Citations: Grounded in Nigerian constitutional law, terrorism legislation, appellate decisions and human‑rights reporting, with scenario elements clearly identified as analytical extrapolations.
