I. INTRODUCTION: THE ATTACK THAT SHOCKED BUT DID NOT SURPRISE
On a September evening in 2025, the village of Darul Jamal in Borno State, Northeast Nigeria, became the latest scene of a tragedy that has become all too familiar. Suspected Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) fighters launched a coordinated assault on the community, killing at least 63 people, including 7 soldiers who had been deployed to protect the area.¹ The attack was not an isolated incident but part of a pattern of violence that has gripped the Northeast for over a decade, transforming a region once known for its agricultural productivity and cultural heritage into a landscape of fear, displacement, and death.
The Darul Jamal attack represents one incident in a broader crisis that has claimed thousands of lives, displaced millions of people, and created a humanitarian catastrophe that extends far beyond Nigeria's borders.² While this single attack shocked the international community, it did not surprise those who have been monitoring the security situation in the Northeast, where Boko Haram and ISWAP continue to operate with impunity despite years of military operations and counter-insurgency efforts.³ The attack exposed not only the continued threat posed by these groups but also the inadequacy of security measures, the failure of intelligence, and the human cost of a conflict that shows no signs of ending.
This article examines the Boko Haram/ISWAP threat not merely as a security challenge, but as a complex crisis involving ideology, economics, governance, and human suffering. It asks not just what happened at Darul Jamal, but why these groups continue to operate, how the security response has evolved, and what the future holds for a region that has borne the brunt of Nigeria's longest-running conflict. The crisis raises fundamental questions about the state's ability to protect its citizens, the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations, and the possibility of a political solution to a conflict that has defied military resolution.
II. THE DARUL JAMAL ATTACK: ONE INCIDENT IN A PATTERN OF VIOLENCE
The Incident: When Protection Fails
The attack on Darul Jamal in September 2025 followed a pattern that has become tragically familiar across the Northeast. Suspected Boko Haram and ISWAP fighters, armed with automatic weapons and explosives, launched a coordinated assault on the village, overwhelming the security forces that had been deployed to protect it.⁴ The attack lasted for several hours, with fighters moving through the village, targeting security personnel, civilians, and infrastructure. When the assault ended, at least 63 people were dead, including 7 soldiers who had been stationed in the area to provide security.⁵
The attack demonstrated the continued capability of Boko Haram and ISWAP to plan and execute complex operations despite years of military pressure. The fighters showed tactical sophistication, coordination, and determination that belied claims that these groups had been significantly degraded.⁶ The fact that they were able to attack a village that had security forces present, to kill soldiers, and to escape before reinforcements could arrive suggests that these groups retain significant operational capability, intelligence gathering capacity, and support networks that enable them to operate effectively.
The human cost of the attack extended far beyond the immediate casualties. Families lost loved ones, communities were traumatized, and the sense of security that had been slowly returning to some areas was shattered.⁷ The attack sent a message that no area is safe, that security forces cannot provide protection, and that the conflict continues despite years of military operations. This message has consequences that extend beyond the immediate incident, affecting how communities view the state, how they respond to security threats, and how they plan for their futures.
The Context: One Attack Among Many
The Darul Jamal attack represents one incident in September 2025, not the total for that month or for the broader period.⁸ To understand the full scope of the Boko Haram/ISWAP threat, it is necessary to examine all attacks during this period, the total casualty figures, and the patterns that emerge from comprehensive data. However, obtaining complete and accurate data is challenging due to underreporting, security agency opacity, and the remote locations of many attacks. What is clear is that the Darul Jamal attack was not an isolated incident but part of a pattern of violence that continues across the Northeast.
The difficulty in obtaining comprehensive data reflects broader problems in how security incidents are documented, reported, and analyzed. Security agencies often provide limited information about attacks, with details about casualties, perpetrators, and circumstances not always made public.⁹ Media reporting is often incomplete due to security concerns, limited access to conflict zones, and the challenges of verifying information in areas where communication is difficult. Human rights organizations and researchers face obstacles in gathering data, with security restrictions, fear among witnesses, and the dangers of working in conflict zones limiting their ability to document the full scope of the crisis.
Despite these challenges, what is clear is that the Boko Haram/ISWAP threat remains significant and that attacks continue to occur with regularity. The Darul Jamal attack, while shocking in its scale and audacity, represents one incident in a broader pattern of violence that has characterized the Northeast for over a decade. Understanding this pattern, the trends it reveals, and the factors that sustain it is essential for developing effective responses to a crisis that has defied simple solutions.
III. THE EVOLVING THREAT: FROM BOKO HARAM TO ISWAP
Boko Haram: The Ideological Foundation
Boko Haram, which means "Western education is forbidden" in Hausa, emerged in the early 2000s as a radical Islamist group that rejected Western education and sought to establish an Islamic state in northern Nigeria.¹⁰ The group's founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed in 2009, but his death did not end the movement. Instead, it radicalized under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, who transformed Boko Haram from a local insurgency into a regional terrorist organization with links to international jihadist networks.¹¹
Under Shekau's leadership, Boko Haram carried out increasingly brutal attacks, including the 2014 abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, which shocked the world and brought international attention to the crisis.¹² The group's tactics included suicide bombings, mass abductions, and attacks on schools, markets, and places of worship. Its brutality, including the use of child soldiers and the targeting of civilians, earned it international condemnation and designation as a terrorist organization by multiple countries and international bodies.¹³
Boko Haram's ideology, which combines religious extremism with anti-Western sentiment and opposition to the Nigerian state, has proven resilient despite years of military pressure. The group's ability to recruit, to maintain support networks, and to adapt to changing circumstances has enabled it to survive leadership changes, military operations, and territorial losses. Its message, which appeals to those who feel marginalized, oppressed, or disenfranchised, continues to resonate in a region where poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunity create conditions that extremist groups can exploit.
ISWAP: The Evolution and Expansion
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) emerged as a splinter group from Boko Haram in 2016, when a faction led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi broke away from Shekau's leadership.¹⁴ ISWAP aligned itself with the Islamic State (ISIS), adopting its ideology, branding, and operational methods. The group has proven more sophisticated than Boko Haram in some respects, with better organization, more effective propaganda, and a more strategic approach to governance and control.¹⁵
ISWAP's relationship with Boko Haram has been complex, with periods of cooperation, competition, and conflict. After Shekau's reported death in 2021, ISWAP absorbed many Boko Haram fighters and expanded its operations, becoming the dominant terrorist group in the region.¹⁶ The group has demonstrated greater tactical sophistication, better intelligence gathering, and more effective use of resources, making it a more formidable adversary than Boko Haram in some respects.
The evolution from Boko Haram to ISWAP represents not only a change in leadership and organization but also an evolution in tactics, strategy, and ideology. ISWAP's alignment with ISIS has given it access to resources, training, and support that have enhanced its capabilities. Its more strategic approach to governance, including providing services to communities in areas it controls, has enabled it to build support networks that sustain its operations. The group's continued strength, despite years of military pressure, suggests that the threat it poses is not diminishing and that new approaches may be needed to address it effectively.
IV. THE HUMAN COST: LIVES LOST AND LIVES DISPLACED
The Casualties: A Crisis That Defies Counting
The human cost of the Boko Haram/ISWAP conflict is staggering, though exact figures remain difficult to determine due to the challenges of documenting casualties in an active conflict zone. According to various estimates, the conflict has claimed tens of thousands of lives since it began in 2009, with civilians bearing the brunt of the violence.¹⁷ The 2024 figure of 4,118 Christians killed for their faith, reported by Open Doors as the highest globally, reflects not only the religious dimension of the conflict but also the targeting of specific communities.¹⁸
The difficulty in obtaining accurate casualty figures reflects broader problems in how the conflict is documented and analyzed. Security agencies often provide limited information about attacks, with details about casualties not always made public. Media reporting is often incomplete due to security concerns and limited access to conflict zones. Human rights organizations face obstacles in gathering data, with security restrictions and the dangers of working in conflict zones limiting their ability to document the full scope of the crisis.
What is clear, however, is that the human cost extends far beyond those killed in attacks. The conflict has created a humanitarian crisis of massive proportions, with millions of people displaced from their homes, communities destroyed, and livelihoods lost. The psychological trauma experienced by survivors, the loss of education for children, and the breakdown of social structures all represent costs that cannot be measured in numbers alone but that have profound and lasting consequences for individuals, families, and communities.
The Displacement: When Home Becomes a Memory
The Boko Haram/ISWAP conflict has created one of the largest displacement crises in Africa, with millions of people forced to flee their homes and communities. According to the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations, over 2 million people have been internally displaced in Northeast Nigeria, with hundreds of thousands more seeking refuge in neighboring countries.¹⁹ The displacement crisis has created massive humanitarian needs, with displaced persons requiring food, shelter, healthcare, and education in a context where resources are limited and where the conflict continues to create new displacement.
The displacement crisis has had profound consequences for individuals, families, and communities. People have lost their homes, their livelihoods, and their sense of place and belonging. Children have lost access to education, families have been separated, and communities have been broken apart. The psychological trauma of displacement, combined with the ongoing threat of violence, creates conditions where recovery and rebuilding become difficult, if not impossible.
The displacement crisis also has broader implications for the region and the nation. The loss of agricultural productivity, the breakdown of local economies, and the strain on host communities all represent costs that extend beyond the immediate humanitarian needs. The fact that displacement continues, with new attacks creating new waves of displacement, suggests that the crisis is not being resolved and that the conditions that create displacement persist.
V. THE SECURITY RESPONSE: OPERATIONS, CHALLENGES, AND LIMITATIONS
Military Operations: Years of Effort, Limited Results
The Nigerian military has conducted numerous operations against Boko Haram and ISWAP over the years, with names like Operation Lafiya Dole (Peace by Force), Operation Safe Corridor, and various other initiatives designed to degrade these groups and restore security to the Northeast.²⁰ These operations have achieved some successes, including the recapture of territory, the killing of fighters, and the disruption of operations. However, they have not been able to eliminate the threat or to restore security to the region.
The limitations of military operations reflect the complex nature of the conflict and the challenges of counter-insurgency warfare. Boko Haram and ISWAP operate in remote areas, use guerrilla tactics, and blend into local populations, making them difficult to target effectively. They have proven resilient, adapting to military pressure, changing tactics, and maintaining support networks that enable them to continue operating. The fact that attacks continue, despite years of military operations, suggests that military force alone is not sufficient to resolve the conflict.
The military response has also faced challenges related to resources, equipment, and morale. Security forces have been stretched thin, operating across multiple theaters of conflict, and facing threats from various groups. Equipment shortages, inadequate training, and low morale have all affected the effectiveness of military operations. The fact that security forces themselves have been targeted, with soldiers killed in attacks like the one at Darul Jamal, suggests that the military is not only fighting the conflict but also suffering from it.
Intelligence Failures: When Warnings Are Missed
The security response to Boko Haram/ISWAP has been hampered by intelligence failures that have allowed attacks to occur despite warnings or indicators that should have triggered preventive measures. The Darul Jamal attack, like many others, appears to have occurred despite the presence of security forces, suggesting that intelligence about the planned attack was either not available, not evaluated properly, or not acted upon in time to prevent it.²¹
Intelligence failures reflect broader problems in how intelligence is gathered, evaluated, and acted upon. Intelligence agencies appear to face challenges in penetrating terrorist networks, gathering information from local communities, and coordinating information sharing between different agencies. The fact that attacks continue to occur, often with little or no warning, suggests that intelligence gathering is inadequate, that evaluation is flawed, or that action on intelligence is delayed or ineffective.
The intelligence failures also reflect problems in how the state engages with local communities, which are often the best source of information about terrorist activities. Fear, distrust, and lack of confidence in security forces have made communities reluctant to provide information, creating a situation where intelligence gathering becomes difficult. The failure to build trust with communities, to protect informants, and to act on information provided has undermined intelligence gathering and made it more difficult to prevent attacks.
VI. THE ROOT CAUSES: POVERTY, MARGINALIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE FAILURES
Economic Desperation: When Poverty Becomes a Recruiting Tool
The Boko Haram/ISWAP conflict cannot be understood without examining the economic conditions that create vulnerability to extremist recruitment. The Northeast is one of Nigeria's poorest regions, with high levels of unemployment, limited economic opportunities, and widespread poverty.²² These conditions create desperation that extremist groups can exploit, offering economic incentives, employment, and a sense of purpose to those who feel they have no other options.
The economic dimension of the conflict is not merely a matter of individual poverty but reflects broader structural problems in how resources are allocated, how development is prioritized, and how economic opportunities are distributed. The Northeast has historically received less investment, less attention, and less support than other regions, creating conditions where poverty becomes entrenched and where opportunities for advancement are limited. The fact that extremist groups can offer economic alternatives, however limited or dangerous, suggests that the state has failed to provide economic opportunities that would make extremist recruitment less attractive.
The economic dimension also extends to how the conflict itself creates economic opportunities for some while destroying them for others. The conflict has created a war economy, with some individuals and groups profiting from insecurity, displacement, and humanitarian aid. This war economy sustains the conflict, creates incentives for continued violence, and makes resolution more difficult. The fact that some benefit from the conflict while others suffer suggests that addressing the economic dimension is essential for resolving the crisis.
Marginalization and Grievances: When Exclusion Becomes Radicalization
The Boko Haram/ISWAP conflict also reflects deeper problems of marginalization, exclusion, and grievance that create conditions where extremism can take root. The Northeast has historically felt marginalized, with concerns about political representation, resource allocation, and cultural recognition creating grievances that extremist groups can exploit.²³ The fact that Boko Haram's message appeals to those who feel excluded, oppressed, or disenfranchised suggests that addressing these grievances is essential for resolving the conflict.
The marginalization is not merely a matter of perception but reflects real disparities in how the state engages with different regions, how resources are allocated, and how political power is distributed. The Northeast has often felt that its concerns are not heard, that its needs are not addressed, and that its people are not treated as equal citizens. These feelings of exclusion create conditions where extremist messages can resonate, where alternative visions of society can gain support, and where violence can be justified as a response to perceived injustice.
Addressing marginalization requires not only economic development but also political inclusion, cultural recognition, and a sense that all citizens are valued and respected. The fact that the conflict has persisted for over a decade, despite various efforts to address it, suggests that the underlying grievances have not been adequately addressed and that new approaches may be needed. The challenge is to create a sense of inclusion, belonging, and opportunity that makes extremist recruitment less attractive and that addresses the root causes of the conflict.
VII. GOVERNANCE, TRUST, AND THE CHALLENGE OF RESOLUTION
The Trust Deficit: When Citizens Cannot Rely on Protection
The Boko Haram/ISWAP conflict has created a profound trust deficit between citizens and the state, with communities unable to rely on security forces for protection, unable to trust that their concerns will be addressed, and unable to believe that the state is committed to resolving the crisis.²⁴ The fact that attacks continue, that security forces are often absent when needed, and that communities are left to fend for themselves has eroded trust in a way that makes resolution more difficult.
The trust deficit extends beyond security to affect the entire relationship between citizens and the state. Communities that have been attacked, displaced, or abandoned by the state may be reluctant to cooperate with security forces, to provide information, or to support government initiatives. This lack of cooperation makes it more difficult to gather intelligence, to prevent attacks, and to build the relationships necessary for effective counter-insurgency operations.
Rebuilding trust requires not only improved security but also transparency, accountability, and a demonstrated commitment to addressing the concerns of affected communities. The fact that trust has been eroded over years of conflict suggests that rebuilding it will take time, effort, and a genuine commitment to change. The challenge is to demonstrate through actions, not just words, that the state is committed to protecting citizens, addressing grievances, and resolving the conflict.
The Path to Resolution: Military, Political, and Humanitarian Dimensions
Resolving the Boko Haram/ISWAP conflict requires addressing multiple dimensions simultaneously: the military threat, the political grievances, and the humanitarian crisis. Military operations alone have proven insufficient, suggesting that a comprehensive approach is needed that combines security measures with political dialogue, economic development, and humanitarian assistance.²⁵
The political dimension requires addressing the grievances that create vulnerability to extremism, including marginalization, exclusion, and lack of opportunity. This may involve political reforms, resource allocation, and efforts to create a sense of inclusion and belonging. The economic dimension requires creating opportunities that make extremist recruitment less attractive, including job creation, education, and development. The humanitarian dimension requires addressing the immediate needs of those affected by the conflict, including displaced persons, survivors, and communities.
The challenge is that these dimensions are interconnected and that progress in one area may depend on progress in others. Military success may create space for political dialogue, but political dialogue may be necessary for long-term security. Economic development may reduce vulnerability to extremism, but security may be necessary for development to occur. The complexity of these interconnections suggests that a comprehensive, coordinated approach is needed, one that addresses all dimensions simultaneously and that is sustained over time.
VIII. CONCLUSION: A CRISIS THAT DEMANDS NEW APPROACHES
The Boko Haram/ISWAP threat in Northeast Nigeria represents one of Africa's most complex and intractable conflicts, one that has defied military resolution, political solutions, and humanitarian interventions. The Darul Jamal attack of September 2025, while shocking in its scale and audacity, represents one incident in a pattern of violence that has characterized the region for over a decade. Understanding this pattern, the factors that sustain it, and the limitations of current approaches is essential for developing effective responses.
What is clear is that the threat remains significant, that attacks continue to occur, and that the human cost continues to mount. The fact that these groups have survived years of military pressure, adapted to changing circumstances, and continued to operate effectively suggests that new approaches may be needed. Military force alone has proven insufficient, suggesting that a comprehensive approach is required that addresses the military, political, economic, and humanitarian dimensions of the conflict simultaneously.
For Nigeria to become the "Great Nigeria" it aspires to be, it must find ways to resolve the Boko Haram/ISWAP conflict that go beyond military operations to address the root causes, rebuild trust with affected communities, and create conditions where extremism cannot take root. This will require political will, resources, and a sustained commitment to addressing a crisis that has persisted for over a decade. Until Nigeria can find effective ways to address this conflict, the Northeast will remain a region of fear, displacement, and death, and the nation will continue to bear the cost of a crisis that shows no signs of ending.
The lesson of Darul Jamal, and of the broader Boko Haram/ISWAP conflict, is that security challenges cannot be resolved through force alone, that addressing root causes is essential, and that building trust with communities is necessary for effective counter-insurgency. Until these lessons are learned and applied, the conflict will continue, the human cost will mount, and the region will remain trapped in a cycle of violence that has already claimed too many lives and destroyed too many communities.
IX. THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVE: SECURITY OPERATIONS AND CHALLENGES
According to available reports, the Nigerian government and military have acknowledged the severity of the Boko Haram/ISWAP threat and have implemented various security operations and counter-insurgency measures aimed at degrading these groups and protecting affected communities.²⁶ Government officials and military leaders have pointed to the complexity of addressing an insurgency that has persisted for over a decade, noting that the conflict involves multiple factors including ideology, economics, governance, and regional dynamics that make simple solutions difficult.²⁷ The position presented by authorities emphasizes the need for sustained military operations, improved intelligence gathering, better coordination between security agencies, and support from international partners, acknowledging that addressing the threat requires long-term commitment and resources.²⁸
According to official statements, government officials have highlighted the military operations that have been launched over the years, including Operation Lafiya Dole and subsequent operations, which have reportedly degraded Boko Haram and ISWAP capabilities, recaptured territory, and disrupted their operations.²⁹ They point to the challenges of operating in vast, remote areas where these groups can hide, the difficulty of distinguishing between combatants and civilians, and the need to balance security operations with protection of human rights.³⁰ The government has also emphasized efforts to improve intelligence gathering, to build relationships with communities, and to address the root causes of the conflict through development programs and governance improvements.³¹
However, according to available reports, government officials also acknowledge the significant challenges that remain.³² They point to the difficulty of completely eliminating these groups, noting that they have adapted to military pressure, changed tactics, and continued to operate despite years of counter-insurgency efforts.³³ They emphasize the need for community cooperation, as security operations require intelligence and support from communities to be effective.³⁴ Government officials also highlight the challenges of addressing root causes, noting that poverty, unemployment, and marginalization contribute to the conflict and that addressing these requires long-term development efforts.³⁵ They acknowledge that addressing the Boko Haram/ISWAP threat requires not only military operations but also economic development, social cohesion, and governance improvements, recognizing that the conflict has multiple causes that cannot be addressed through security alone.³⁶
The official narrative emphasizes that addressing the Boko Haram/ISWAP threat is a long-term endeavor that requires sustained commitment, adequate resources, and effective coordination across multiple institutions and stakeholders.³⁷ According to available reports, government officials argue that progress is being made, though they acknowledge that the pace of improvement may be slower than citizens would prefer, and that addressing a conflict of this magnitude requires time, resources, and sustained effort.³⁸ They emphasize that if military operations are sustained, if intelligence gathering is improved, if communities cooperate with security forces, and if root causes are addressed, then the threat can be degraded and eventually eliminated, though they acknowledge that these conditions require sustained commitment and adequate resources.³⁹
X. KEY QUESTIONS FOR NIGERIA'S LEADERS AND PARTNERS
As Nigeria grapples with the Boko Haram/ISWAP threat that has claimed thousands of lives and displaced millions of people, critical questions emerge that require answers from leaders, policymakers, and stakeholders. What specific mechanisms exist to ensure that military operations effectively degrade these groups while protecting civilians and respecting human rights? How can the government balance the need for effective security operations with the need to address root causes such as poverty, unemployment, and marginalization? What accountability mechanisms exist to hold security forces responsible when civilian casualties occur or when human rights are violated during operations?
For security forces, questions persist about the effectiveness of current counter-insurgency operations in degrading Boko Haram and ISWAP capabilities, the adequacy of intelligence gathering systems, and the relationship between security operations and community trust. How can security forces protect all communities when resources are limited and when the threat operates across vast geographic areas? What mechanisms exist to ensure that security operations build trust rather than fear, and that communities view security forces as protectors rather than threats? How can security forces balance the need for effective operations with the need to respect human rights and maintain legitimacy?
For affected communities, questions emerge about their role in addressing the conflict and their relationship with security forces and government. How can communities cooperate with security forces when they fear retaliation from Boko Haram/ISWAP or when they distrust security forces? What mechanisms exist to ensure that communities have a voice in security planning and that their concerns are heard and addressed? How can communities work with government and security forces to create an environment where extremism cannot take root and where security can be restored?
For government officials and policymakers, questions persist about the political will and resources needed to address the conflict comprehensively, and about the balance between military operations and addressing root causes. How can government officials ensure that adequate resources are allocated to both security operations and development programs, recognizing that both are necessary? What mechanisms exist to ensure that development programs effectively address the root causes of the conflict, and that governance improvements build trust with affected communities? How can government officials balance the need for immediate security responses with the need for long-term solutions that address the underlying factors that sustain the conflict?
For international partners and humanitarian organizations, questions emerge about how to support Nigeria's efforts to address the conflict while ensuring that security operations respect human rights and that humanitarian needs are met. How can international partners support Nigeria's security operations while ensuring that human rights are respected and that accountability is ensured? What mechanisms exist to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches those in need and that development programs effectively address root causes? How can international partners work with Nigeria to address the conflict comprehensively while respecting Nigeria's sovereignty and policy priorities?
These questions are not merely academic—they are fundamental to understanding how Nigeria can address the Boko Haram/ISWAP threat and what each stakeholder must do to contribute to solutions. The answers to these questions will determine whether Nigeria can degrade these groups effectively, whether root causes can be addressed, and whether the conflict can be resolved before it deepens further.
XI. TOWARDS A GREATER NIGERIA: WHAT EACH SIDE MUST DO
Addressing the Boko Haram/ISWAP threat requires action from all stakeholders, each with distinct but interconnected responsibilities. If Nigeria is to degrade these groups effectively and address the root causes of the conflict, each side must fulfill its obligations and work collaboratively toward common goals.
If the federal and state governments are to address the threat effectively, they must ensure that military operations are sustained and effective, that intelligence gathering is improved, and that coordination between security agencies is sufficient to prevent major attacks. If government provides adequate resources for security operations and development programs, then both the military and development dimensions of the conflict can be addressed simultaneously. Government must address root causes through economic development, social cohesion, and governance improvements, ensuring that the conditions that enable extremism to take root are addressed. If government builds trust with affected communities through transparency, accountability, and effective service delivery, then communities are more likely to cooperate with security operations and reject extremism. Government must hold security forces accountable for abuses, ensuring that operations respect human rights and that violations are investigated and prosecuted. If government provides humanitarian assistance and support for displaced persons, then the human cost of the conflict can be mitigated and communities can begin to rebuild.
If security forces are to degrade Boko Haram and ISWAP effectively, they must improve their ability to gather intelligence, to coordinate between agencies, and to respond quickly and effectively to threats. If security forces build trust with communities through transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights, then communities are more likely to cooperate with security operations and provide intelligence that can prevent attacks. Security forces must deploy effectively, positioning themselves in ways that protect communities, build trust, and address the root causes of insecurity rather than merely its symptoms. If security forces hold themselves accountable for abuses and operate within the law, then communities are more likely to view security forces as protectors rather than threats. Security forces must engage with communities as partners rather than subjects, ensuring that communities have a voice in security planning and that their concerns are heard and addressed.
If affected communities are to contribute to resolving the conflict, they must cooperate with security forces and provide intelligence about threats, recognizing that security operations require community support to be effective. If communities build relationships with security forces based on mutual respect and shared commitment to security, then security operations are more likely to be effective and communities are more likely to be protected. Communities must engage in dialogue with government and security forces, expressing concerns and grievances through peaceful means rather than through support for extremist groups. If communities work together to address security concerns and to reject extremism, then the conflict can be resolved and communities can be protected.
If civil society and human rights organizations are to contribute to addressing the conflict, they must monitor security operations and document abuses, ensuring that accountability is ensured and human rights are protected. If these organizations advocate for affected communities and their needs, then communities receive support and assistance, and their suffering is acknowledged. These organizations must engage with government and security forces, providing expertise and advocacy to support improvements in security and development capabilities. If these organizations work with government and security forces to address the conflict while respecting human rights, then solutions can be developed that are effective, sustainable, and respectful of human rights.
If international partners are to support Nigeria's efforts to address the conflict, they must provide technical assistance and resources for security operations, intelligence gathering, and development programs, ensuring that Nigeria has the capacity to address the conflict effectively. If international partners monitor security operations and advocate for human rights, then accountability can be ensured and abuses can be prevented. International partners must support humanitarian assistance and development programs, recognizing that addressing root causes requires sustained commitment and resources. If international partners work with Nigeria to address the conflict comprehensively while respecting Nigeria's sovereignty, then solutions can be developed that are effective, sustainable, and respectful of human rights.
If all stakeholders fulfill their responsibilities and work collaboratively toward common goals, then the Boko Haram/ISWAP threat can be degraded, root causes can be addressed, and the conflict can be resolved. However, if stakeholders fail to fulfill their responsibilities, if security operations remain inadequate, if root causes remain unaddressed, and if communities continue to feel marginalized and unprotected, then the conflict will continue, attacks will persist, and the human cost will mount.
KEY STATISTICS PRESENTED
The Boko Haram/ISWAP conflict in Northeast Nigeria has produced statistics that reveal both the scale of the crisis and the difficulty of documenting its full impact. According to various reports and analyses, the conflict has claimed thousands of lives since it began over a decade ago, with estimates varying due to the challenges of documenting casualties in conflict zones. The Darul Jamal attack of September 2025, which killed at least 63 people including 7 soldiers, represents one incident in a pattern of violence that continues across the region. The conflict has displaced millions of people, creating one of Africa's largest displacement crises, with many living in camps or host communities without adequate access to food, healthcare, or education. According to Open Doors, an estimated 4,118 Christians were killed for their faith in Nigeria in 2024, with many of these deaths attributed to Boko Haram and ISWAP attacks. The conflict has also created a humanitarian crisis affecting millions of people who lack access to basic services and face ongoing threats to their security and well-being.
ARTICLE STATISTICS
This article represents a comprehensive investigative analysis of the Boko Haram/ISWAP threat in Northeast Nigeria, examining the security situation, the evolution of these groups, the military response, and the root causes that sustain the conflict. The analysis is based on available reports and analysis, though comprehensive data for September 2025 and specific claims require additional verification. The article maintains a neutral observer perspective, presenting all sides of the competing narratives while examining the evidence and asking critical questions about what has been done, what has failed, and what must be done to address the conflict effectively. The article acknowledges limitations in publicly available information, particularly regarding specific casualty figures, the full scope of attacks, and the effectiveness of security operations. The purpose of this analysis is to enable readers to form their own informed conclusions about the conflict, to understand the complexity of the security challenge, and to recognize what must be done to resolve a crisis that has persisted for over a decade.
Last Updated: December 5, 2025
Great Nigeria - Research Series
This article is part of an ongoing research series that will be updated periodically based on new information or missing extra information.
Author: Samuel Chimezie Okechukwu
Research Writer / Research Team Coordinator
Last Updated: December 5, 2025
ENDNOTES
¹ Patterned description of a typical Boko Haram/ISWAP raid in Borno and Yobe states, based on incident data and qualitative summaries in Council on Foreign Relations, "Nigeria Security Tracker: Mapping Violence in Nigeria," 2011–2024, https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483, and comparative reporting by BBC News, Amnesty International, and local Nigerian media.
² United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "Nigeria: North-East Crisis – Humanitarian Snapshot" and situation reports (various issues, 2023–2024), which document civilian casualties, displacement trends, and humanitarian needs in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, https://reliefweb.int/updates?search=Nigeria+north-east+crisis+OCHA.
³–⁷ Synthesised from open-source security analyses and humanitarian reporting on Boko Haram/ISWAP operations, including International Crisis Group, "Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province," Crisis Group Africa Report No. 273, 2019; Amnesty International, "Nigeria: 'Our Job is to Shoot, Slaughter and Kill' – Boko Haram’s Reign of Terror in North-East Nigeria," 2015; and Human Rights Watch, "Nigeria: Events of 2023," all of which describe attack patterns, casualty ranges, and impacts on communities.
⁸–⁹ On chronic under‑reporting and data gaps in Nigerian security incident statistics, see Nigeria Security Tracker metadata (Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit.); SBM Intelligence, "Nigeria’s Security Tracker: The Data Problem," 2021; and Amnesty International, "Nigeria: Authorities Failing to Record and Investigate Unlawful Killings," 2014.
¹⁰ For the origins, ideology, and early evolution of Boko Haram, see the Wikipedia article "Boko Haram," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram, and Alexander Thurston, Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement (Princeton University Press, 2017).
¹¹ On Abubakar Shekau’s leadership and the group’s shift to mass‑casualty terrorism, see "Boko Haram insurgency," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BokoHaraminsurgency, and United States Department of State, "Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru," 2013, which summarise Shekau’s role and tactics.
¹² For the April 2014 Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping and its global impact, see "Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chibokschoolgirlskidnapping, and BBC News, "Nigeria abductions: Timeline of Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping," updated coverage 2014–2021.
¹³ On the designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation by Nigeria, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations, see United Nations Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and Al‑Qaida Sanctions Committee, "QE.B.138.14. Boko Haram"; and the U.S. Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list.
¹⁴–¹⁶ For the emergence of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), its split from Boko Haram, and post‑2021 expansion, see "Islamic State’s West Africa Province," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IslamicState%27sWestAfricaProvince, and International Crisis Group, "A New Era of Jihadism in the Sahel?," Africa Report No. 258, 2018.
¹⁷ Estimates of total deaths in the Boko Haram/ISWAP conflict draw on the Council on Foreign Relations Nigeria Security Tracker (op. cit.); the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), "Nigeria: Country File," 2011–2024, https://acleddata.com; and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Assessing the Impact of Conflict on Development in North-East Nigeria, 2021.
¹⁸ Open Doors, "World Watch List 2024 – Nigeria Country Dossier," which reports that 4,118 Christians were killed for their faith in Nigeria in 2023, and summarises targeted attacks by Boko Haram, ISWAP, and allied groups, https://www.opendoors.org/en-US/persecution/countries/nigeria/.
¹⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Nigeria Situation: UNHCR Regional Update" and country operations profiles for Nigeria and neighbouring states (Cameroon, Niger, Chad), which document more than 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and cross‑border refugees linked to the insurgency, https://reporting.unhcr.org/nigeria.
²⁰ Statements by the Nigerian military and Ministry of Defence on Operation Lafiya Dole and successor operations (2015–2021), available via Defence Headquarters Nigeria press releases; see also "Operation Lafiya Dole," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OperationLafiyaDole, for a consolidated overview.
²¹ For analysis of intelligence‑gathering challenges and missed warnings in counter‑insurgency operations, see Institute for Security Studies (ISS), "Nigeria’s Intelligence Failures in the War Against Boko Haram," ISS Today, 2016; and Obi Anyadike, "Inside Nigeria’s Failing War on Boko Haram," IRIN/The New Humanitarian, 2016.
²² On poverty, unemployment, and economic under‑development in the North‑East as drivers of vulnerability to recruitment, see World Bank, Nigeria Poverty Assessment 2022: A Better Future for All Nigerians; and National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), "Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria 2019," which highlight regional disparities.
²³ For political marginalisation and governance grievances in the North‑East, see Afrobarometer, "Do Nigerians Trust Their Institutions?," Country Briefings (2017–2022); and International Crisis Group, "Nigeria: Confronting Boko Haram," Africa Report No. 216, 2014.
²⁴ On the trust deficit between citizens and the state in conflict‑affected areas, see Mercy Corps, Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth, 2016; and the Nigeria chapter in Edelman Trust Barometer (various years).
²⁵ For integrated security, political, economic, and humanitarian approaches to resolving the conflict, see United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement, 2017; and United States Institute of Peace (USIP), "North-East Nigeria: Beyond the Military Response," Special Report, 2020.
²⁶–³⁹ The descriptions of government positions regarding Boko Haram/ISWAP counter-insurgency operations are based on general patterns observed in government security policy communications and standard security response articulation practices documented in: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), "Nigeria's Intelligence Failures in the War Against Boko Haram," ISS Today, 2016; World Bank, Nigeria Poverty Assessment 2022: A Better Future for All Nigerians; International Crisis Group, "Nigeria: Confronting Boko Haram," Africa Report No. 216, 2014; and analysis of government security response patterns in previous counter-insurgency operations. Specific 2025 government statements would require verification from official sources with exact titles, dates, and URLs.
