DID NIGERIA'S SWIFT INTERVENTION IN BENIN EXPOSE A PARADOX OF POWER?

Introduction: Questions That Demand Investigation

In the early hours of December 7, 2025, chaos erupted in Cotonou, Benin Republic. According to multiple news reports, eight soldiers stormed the national television station, declaring the dissolution of President Patrice Talon's government.^¹ Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri, speaking for the self-proclaimed Military Committee for Refoundation, allegedly cited deteriorating security in northern Benin and the neglect of fallen soldiers as justification for the takeover.^² Within hours, according to official statements, Nigerian fighter jets were in the air, ground troops were crossing the border, and by evening, President Talon appeared on state television declaring the situation "completely under control."^³

The coup attempt was reportedly thwarted, with Nigeria's military allegedly playing a decisive role in preserving constitutional order in a neighboring state.^⁴ But this swift resolution raises fundamental questions that demand investigation rather than assumption.

Why could Nigeria deploy fighter jets and special forces to Benin within hours, while citizens across Nigeria's own northern states reportedly continue to face attacks from bandits, kidnappers demanding ransoms for abducted schoolchildren, and communities pleading for military protection that seems perpetually delayed?^⁵ This apparent paradox—the ability to project power across borders with precision and speed, while struggling to secure citizens at home—has sparked intense debate. But what are the facts? What are the different perspectives? And what might this reveal about priorities, capabilities, and the very meaning of sovereignty in contemporary West Africa?

The Benin intervention occurred against a backdrop of unprecedented military coups across West and Central Africa. Since 2020, successful coups have allegedly toppled governments in Mali (2020, 2021), Chad (2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), Niger (2023), and Guinea-Bissau (2024).^⁶ Each coup has reportedly been met with condemnation from regional bodies, threats of sanctions, and in some cases, the deployment of standby forces. Yet the pattern continues, raising fundamental questions about the stability of democratic institutions, the role of external powers, and whether Africa is experiencing a new form of neocolonialism disguised as regional cooperation—or whether regional cooperation is genuinely necessary for stability.

This investigative article does not seek to provide definitive answers, but rather to systematically explore the questions, examine the evidence, present various perspectives, and allow readers to draw their own conclusions. It investigates the historical trajectory of military coups in Africa, with particular focus on Nigeria's own complex relationship with military rule. It examines the December 2025 Benin coup attempt in detail, exploring the mixed reactions from government officials, opposition voices, regional actors, and international partners. It interrogates the legal and constitutional framework governing Nigeria's intervention capabilities, asking what the law actually says and what questions remain unanswered. Most critically, it investigates why citizens are reportedly crying for help with security challenges at home, even as their government demonstrates the capacity for rapid, effective military action abroad.

The investigation considers multiple perspectives on whether international players—particularly former colonial powers like France—benefit from instability in Africa, and whether the current pattern of coups represents a new form of neocolonialism or genuine regional cooperation. It asks whether Africa can ever truly be free when external powers maintain military bases, economic dependencies, and political influence—or whether such relationships are necessary for stability and development.

Throughout this investigation, we will present facts, examine claims, explore different viewpoints, and leave the final judgment to the reader. Our goal is not to take sides, but to expose the truth systematically, bridge gaps between warring parties, and recommend a way forward that serves democracy, lasting peace, and the greater good of all citizens.

I. The Historical Context: Understanding Military Coups in Africa

To understand the December 2025 events in Benin and Nigeria's response, we must first investigate the historical context of military coups in Africa. This is not to justify or condemn, but to understand patterns, causes, and consequences that inform current events.

The Pattern of Military Intervention

The phenomenon of military coups in Africa is well-documented. Since the wave of independence movements in the 1960s, the continent has experienced over 200 successful and attempted military coups, making it the most coup-prone region in the world according to academic research.^⁷ The first successful post-independence coup in sub-Saharan Africa allegedly occurred in Togo in 1963, when Gnassingbé Eyadéma and his colleagues assassinated President Sylvanus Olympio.^⁸ This event reportedly set a pattern that would repeat across the continent for decades.

But what drives these coups? Academic research suggests that the reasons cited by coup leaders have remained remarkably consistent across decades: corruption, economic mismanagement, electoral fraud, insecurity, and the neglect of military personnel.^⁹ However, the question remains: are these legitimate grievances, or convenient justifications for power grabs? The answer likely varies by case, and readers must evaluate the evidence for themselves.

Nigeria's Own Complex History

Nigeria's history with military rule is particularly instructive for understanding the current situation. Between 1966 and 1999, Nigeria allegedly experienced six successful military coups and multiple failed attempts, with military governments ruling for 29 of those 33 years according to historical records.^¹⁰ The first coup in January 1966, led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu and other young officers, reportedly resulted in the deaths of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and several regional premiers.^¹¹ The counter-coup in July 1966, which brought General Yakubu Gowon to power, was followed by the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), a conflict that allegedly claimed over one million lives.^¹²

Subsequent Nigerian coups in 1975, 1983, 1985, and 1993 reportedly reflected various grievances: corruption, economic mismanagement, electoral fraud, and perceived threats to national unity.^¹³ The 1993 coup that brought General Sani Abacha to power was particularly significant, as it allegedly interrupted what many considered Nigeria's freest and fairest election, won by Chief Moshood Abiola.^¹⁴ Abacha's regime, which lasted until his death in 1998, was reportedly marked by severe human rights abuses, the execution of environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, and the imprisonment of numerous political opponents according to human rights organizations.^¹⁵

This history raises important questions: Does Nigeria's experience with military rule make it more or less qualified to intervene in other countries' political crises? Does it give Nigeria unique insight into the dangers of military intervention, or does it create a bias toward preserving any civilian government, regardless of its democratic credentials? These are questions that different observers answer differently, and we present the evidence for readers to consider.

The Regional Pattern

Across West Africa, similar patterns have reportedly emerged. Ghana allegedly experienced multiple coups between 1966 and 1981, with Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings leading two successful takeovers.^¹⁶ Burkina Faso reportedly saw numerous coups, including the 1987 assassination of Thomas Sankara by his close associate Blaise Compaoré.^¹⁷ Mali allegedly experienced coups in 1968, 1991, 2012, 2020, and 2021.^¹⁸ The Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, and other nations have similarly turbulent histories of military intervention in politics according to historical records.

What has changed, however, is the international response. During the Cold War, coups were allegedly often supported or opposed based on the ideological alignment of the new regime with either the United States or the Soviet Union.^¹⁹ Since the end of the Cold War, regional bodies like the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have reportedly developed protocols condemning unconstitutional changes of government.^²⁰

Yet the recent wave of coups suggests that these protocols may have limited deterrent effect. Between 2020 and 2025, West and Central Africa have allegedly experienced more successful coups than any comparable period since the 1980s.^²¹ This resurgence has reportedly coincided with growing frustration over economic conditions, security challenges, and perceived failures of democratic governance. But correlation does not necessarily mean causation, and different analysts interpret these patterns differently.

Some argue that the coups reflect genuine popular frustration with failed democratic governments. Others contend that they represent opportunistic power grabs by military elites. Still others suggest that external factors—economic pressures, security threats, or foreign interference—create conditions that make coups more likely. The truth likely involves elements of all these factors, and readers must weigh the evidence themselves.

II. The Recent Wave: Investigating the Resurgence of Coups (2020-2025)

The period from 2020 to 2025 has witnessed what many analysts describe as an unprecedented resurgence of military coups in West and Central Africa, challenging the narrative of democratic consolidation that had allegedly gained traction in the 1990s and 2000s.^²² But is this resurgence real, or does it merely reflect increased media attention? And what are the various explanations for this pattern?

Mali: The Beginning of the Wave?

The wave allegedly began in Mali in August 2020, when soldiers led by Colonel Assimi Goïta reportedly overthrew President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, citing corruption, economic mismanagement, and the government's alleged failure to address a long-running insurgency.^²³ The coup was reportedly met with international condemnation, but the military junta allegedly proceeded with a transition plan that ultimately saw Goïta seize power again in May 2021, removing the interim civilian president.^²⁴

But what were the actual grievances? Some analysts argue that Keïta's government was genuinely corrupt and ineffective. Others contend that the military exploited popular frustration for its own purposes. Still others suggest that external factors—including French military presence and economic pressures—contributed to instability. The truth likely involves multiple factors, and different observers emphasize different elements.

Chad: A Different Form of Transition

Chad allegedly experienced a different form of transition in April 2021, when President Idriss Déby was reportedly killed in combat against rebel forces.^²⁵ His son, General Mahamat Déby, immediately assumed power at the head of a military council, allegedly bypassing constitutional provisions that would have transferred power to the speaker of parliament.^²⁶ While not a traditional coup, the military's assumption of power without following constitutional succession procedures reportedly drew criticism from regional bodies.^²⁷

But was this a coup, or a necessary response to a crisis? Supporters of the transition argue that Chad faced an existential threat from rebels, and that constitutional succession would have created a power vacuum. Critics contend that the military exploited the crisis to seize power. The question remains: what was the actual motivation, and what were the alternatives?

Guinea: Promises and Delays

Guinea's coup in September 2021 allegedly saw Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, head of the country's special forces, reportedly overthrow President Alpha Condé, who had controversially won a third term after amending the constitution.^²⁸ Doumbouya allegedly cited corruption, human rights abuses, and economic mismanagement as justification, promising a transition to civilian rule.^²⁹ However, as of late 2025, Guinea reportedly remains under military governance, with the transition timeline repeatedly extended.^³⁰

This raises critical questions: Were Doumbouya's promises genuine, or were they merely rhetoric to gain international acceptance? Is the delay in transition due to genuine challenges, or to the military's desire to retain power? Different observers have different views, and the evidence must be examined carefully.

Burkina Faso: Two Coups in One Year

Burkina Faso allegedly experienced two coups in 2022. In January, soldiers led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba reportedly overthrew President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, citing his alleged failure to address a worsening jihadist insurgency.^³¹ Eight months later, in September 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traoré allegedly ousted Damiba, claiming that Damiba had similarly failed to improve security conditions.^³² Traoré reportedly remains in power as of late 2025, with no clear timeline for a return to civilian rule.^³³

But what explains this pattern? Some argue that the security situation was genuinely dire, and that civilian governments were unable to address it. Others contend that the military exploited security challenges to justify power grabs. Still others suggest that external factors—including French military presence and economic pressures—contributed to instability. The question remains: what combination of factors led to these coups, and what might have prevented them?

Niger: A Key Western Ally Falls

Niger's coup in July 2023 was particularly significant, as it allegedly removed President Mohamed Bazoum, a key Western ally in the fight against jihadist groups in the Sahel.^³⁴ General Abdourahmane Tchiani, head of the presidential guard, reportedly led the takeover, which was allegedly met with threats of military intervention from ECOWAS.^³⁵ The regional body allegedly imposed severe economic sanctions and activated a standby force, but ultimately did not intervene militarily.^³⁶ The coup further complicated regional security dynamics, as Niger had allegedly hosted French and American military bases that were subsequently ordered to leave.^³⁷

This case raises multiple questions: Why did ECOWAS threaten intervention but not follow through? Was this due to genuine concerns about the consequences, or to lack of capacity? Did the coup reflect popular frustration with Bazoum's government, or was it driven by other factors? Different analysts have different interpretations, and readers must assess the evidence.

Guinea-Bissau: The Most Recent Case

Most recently, Guinea-Bissau allegedly experienced a coup in November 2024, when soldiers reportedly seized power following disputed election results.^³⁸ The coup leaders allegedly claimed that the electoral process had been manipulated, though international observers had reportedly declared the elections generally free and fair.^³⁹ The incident allegedly highlighted the fragility of democratic institutions in a country that has experienced multiple coups since independence.^⁴⁰

But what was the actual situation? Were the elections genuinely free and fair, or did international observers miss manipulation? Were the coup leaders motivated by genuine concerns about electoral fraud, or by other factors? These questions remain subject to debate, and different observers have different views.

Common Characteristics: Pattern or Coincidence?

Each of these coups has reportedly shared common characteristics: they have allegedly been led by mid-level or senior military officers, they have cited security failures and corruption as justification, and they have occurred in countries facing significant economic challenges and security threats.^⁴¹ But does this represent a pattern, or mere coincidence?

Some analysts argue that these common characteristics suggest a regional crisis of democratic governance. Others contend that they reflect opportunistic power grabs by military elites who exploit genuine grievances. Still others suggest that external factors—including economic pressures, security threats, or foreign interference—create conditions that make coups more likely.

The pattern allegedly suggests that democratic institutions in many West African states remain fragile, unable to address the fundamental grievances that drive military intervention.^⁴² But the question remains: is this fragility inherent to these countries, or does it reflect specific failures of governance, economic policy, or international relations? Different observers answer this question differently, and readers must weigh the evidence themselves.

III. The Benin Coup Attempt: Investigating What Actually Happened

The December 7, 2025 coup attempt in Benin Republic unfolded with remarkable speed, according to multiple news reports.^⁴³ But what actually happened? What were the motivations? And what questions remain unanswered?

The Initial Reports: What We Know and What We Don't

According to multiple news sources, at approximately 6:00 AM local time on December 7, 2025, a group of eight soldiers allegedly stormed the offices of the Office de Radiodiffusion et Télévision du Bénin (ORTB), the national broadcaster in Cotonou.^⁴⁴ They allegedly disarmed security personnel, took control of the broadcast facilities, and forced technicians to air a pre-recorded statement.^⁴⁵

Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri, appearing in military uniform, allegedly read a declaration announcing the dissolution of President Patrice Talon's government, the suspension of the constitution, and the establishment of a military committee to govern the country.^⁴⁶ The statement allegedly cited several grievances: deteriorating security conditions in northern Benin, where jihadist groups from neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger had reportedly been conducting attacks; the neglect of fallen soldiers and their families; favoritism and corruption within the military hierarchy; and economic hardship affecting both civilians and military personnel.^⁴⁷

But were these grievances genuine, or were they mere justifications? The coup plotters allegedly claimed that President Talon, who had been in power since 2016 and was re-elected in 2021, had failed to address these fundamental issues.^⁴⁸ They allegedly promised to restore security, fight corruption, and organize free and fair elections once stability was restored.^⁴⁹ However, the statement reportedly provided no clear timeline for a return to civilian rule, raising questions about the plotters' ultimate intentions.^⁵⁰

The Response: Swift Action or Overreaction?

Within hours of the broadcast, according to official statements, loyalist forces allegedly began mobilizing. The Beninese Armed Forces, under the command of Chief of Defense Staff General Fructueux Gbaguidi, allegedly issued a statement condemning the coup attempt and calling on all military personnel to remain loyal to the constitutional government.^⁵¹ Security forces allegedly began retaking key installations, including the ORTB building, where they reportedly engaged in a brief firefight with the coup plotters.^⁵²

But was this response proportional? Some observers argue that the swift response prevented a potentially catastrophic situation. Others question whether eight soldiers with limited support could have genuinely threatened the government, suggesting that the response may have been excessive. Still others point out that the speed of the response raises questions about whether the government had advance warning or whether it was simply well-prepared.

Nigeria's Intervention: Invitation or Initiative?

According to official statements, President Talon, who was reportedly in his residence in Cotonou at the time of the coup attempt, immediately contacted regional leaders, including Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, who serves as Chairman of ECOWAS.^⁵³ According to these statements, Talon allegedly requested immediate military assistance from Nigeria, specifically requesting air support and ground troops to help quell the mutiny.^⁵⁴

But questions remain: Was this request genuine, or was it coordinated in advance? Why was Nigeria able to respond so quickly? Did Nigeria have forces pre-positioned, or was this a demonstration of remarkable operational capability? Different observers have different interpretations, and the evidence must be examined carefully.

According to official statements, Nigerian Air Force fighter jets were allegedly scrambled and began patrolling Benin's airspace within hours of the request.^⁵⁵ Ground troops, including special forces units, were allegedly deployed across the border to assist Beninese forces in securing key installations.^⁵⁶ The Nigerian military's rapid response capability, reportedly honed through years of counter-insurgency operations in the northeast, allegedly proved effective in this regional intervention.^⁵⁷

But this raises critical questions: If Nigeria can deploy forces to Benin within hours, why can it not deploy forces to its own northern states with similar speed? Is this a question of capability, or of priority? Different observers answer this question differently, and readers must weigh the evidence.

The Aftermath: Questions About Justice and Reconciliation

By late afternoon on December 7, according to official statements, Interior Minister Alassane Seidou allegedly announced that the coup attempt had been foiled.^⁵⁸ He allegedly stated that loyalist forces, with support from Nigeria and other ECOWAS members, had regained control of all key installations.^⁵⁹ Fourteen individuals were reportedly arrested in connection with the coup attempt, though it remained unclear whether Lieutenant Colonel Tigri was among them.^⁶⁰

President Talon allegedly appeared on state television that evening, confirming that the situation was "completely under control."^⁶¹ He allegedly expressed condolences to victims of what he called a "senseless adventure" and promised that those responsible would face severe punishment.^⁶² Talon also allegedly acknowledged the support received from Nigeria and other regional partners, emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation in maintaining constitutional order.^⁶³

But questions remain: Will those arrested receive fair trials? Will the underlying grievances that motivated the coup attempt be addressed, or will they be ignored? Will this incident lead to greater democratic reform, or to greater authoritarianism? These are questions that only time can answer, but they are questions that observers must continue to ask.

The Grievances: Genuine Concerns or Convenient Justifications?

The coup plotters allegedly cited several grievances: deteriorating security conditions in northern Benin, where jihadist groups from neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger had reportedly been conducting attacks; the neglect of fallen soldiers and their families; favoritism and corruption within the military hierarchy; and economic hardship affecting both civilians and military personnel.^⁶⁴

But were these grievances genuine? Reports indicate that, northern Benin has indeed faced security challenges, with jihadist groups allegedly conducting attacks.^⁶⁵ According to other reports, the military has allegedly faced resource constraints and alleged neglect.^⁶⁶ But the question remains: were these conditions severe enough to justify a coup attempt, or were they convenient justifications for a power grab?

Different observers have different views. Some argue that the grievances were genuine and that the coup attempt reflected legitimate frustration. Others contend that the grievances were exaggerated and that the coup attempt was driven by other motivations. Still others suggest that the grievances were real but that a coup was not the appropriate response. Readers must examine the evidence and draw their own conclusions.

IV. Mixed Reactions: Investigating the Various Perspectives

The Benin coup attempt and Nigeria's intervention elicited a complex array of reactions from various stakeholders. Understanding these different perspectives is essential to comprehending the broader implications. This section investigates the various viewpoints without taking sides, presenting the evidence for readers to evaluate.

Government Perspectives: Regional Leadership or Overreach?

The Nigerian government, led by President Bola Tinubu, allegedly presented the intervention as a necessary and successful exercise in regional leadership. According to official statements released on December 8, 2025, Tinubu allegedly praised the Nigerian Armed Forces for "standing as a defender and protector of constitutional order in the Republic of Benin on the invitation of the government."^⁶⁷ The statement allegedly emphasized that Nigeria had responded to a formal request from the Beninese government, acting in accordance with ECOWAS protocols and international law.^⁶⁸

But questions remain: Was this truly about defending democracy, or about preserving a particular regime? Some observers argue that Nigeria's intervention was necessary to prevent chaos and protect regional stability. Others question whether the intervention was motivated by other factors, such as economic interests, political relationships, or strategic considerations. Still others point out that the speed of the response raises questions about advance coordination or preparation.

According to official statements, Nigeria's intervention allegedly demonstrated the country's commitment to regional stability and its capacity to act decisively when democratic institutions are threatened.^⁶⁹ The government allegedly framed the operation as evidence of Nigeria's role as a regional power with both the capability and the responsibility to maintain peace and security in West Africa.^⁷⁰ This narrative allegedly aligned with Nigeria's historical position as a key contributor to peacekeeping operations across the continent, from Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s to more recent engagements in Mali and the Lake Chad region.^⁷¹

But does this historical role justify current interventions? Some argue that Nigeria has a responsibility to maintain regional stability. Others question whether Nigeria should focus on its own domestic challenges before intervening abroad. Still others suggest that Nigeria's interventions may serve other purposes beyond regional stability. These are questions that different observers answer differently.

The Beninese Government: Gratitude or Dependency?

The Beninese government, for its part, allegedly expressed gratitude for Nigeria's swift response. According to official statements, President Talon allegedly emphasized the importance of regional cooperation and praised the effectiveness of the joint operation.^⁷² However, some observers have noted that Talon's government has allegedly been criticized for democratic backsliding, including restrictions on opposition activities and media freedom.^⁷³ This has raised questions about whether the intervention was truly about defending democracy or about preserving a particular regime.

But what is the actual situation? Evidence suggests that, Talon's government has allegedly implemented policies that have restricted democratic space.^⁷⁴ According to other reports, these policies have allegedly been necessary for stability and development.^⁷⁵ The question remains: is Talon's government genuinely democratic, or has it become authoritarian? Different observers have different views, and readers must review the evidence.

Opposition Voices: Legitimate Concerns or Political Opportunism?

Nigerian opposition parties and civil society organizations allegedly offered more critical perspectives. Sources show that, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and other opposition groups allegedly questioned the speed and decisiveness of the Benin intervention, contrasting it with what they described as a slow and inadequate response to security challenges within Nigeria.^⁷⁶ They allegedly pointed to ongoing banditry in the northwest, kidnapping in the north-central region, and insurgency in the northeast, asking why similar urgency was not applied to protecting Nigerian citizens.^⁷⁷

But are these concerns legitimate, or are they political opportunism? Some argue that the opposition is raising valid questions about priorities and capabilities. Others contend that the opposition is exploiting the situation for political gain. Still others suggest that both perspectives may have merit—that Nigeria may have both the capability to intervene abroad and the responsibility to address domestic challenges. Readers must weigh the evidence.

Some opposition figures allegedly raised constitutional questions about the intervention. Data reveals that, they allegedly asked whether the deployment of Nigerian troops to a foreign country required parliamentary approval, and whether the executive had exceeded its authority by authorizing military action without consulting the National Assembly.^⁷⁸ These questions allegedly touched on fundamental issues of separation of powers and the constitutional limits of presidential authority in matters of war and peace.^⁷⁹

But what does the law actually say? This is a question that requires careful examination of constitutional provisions, legal precedents, and expert opinions. We will investigate this in a later section.

Beninese Opposition: Mixed Reactions

In Benin, opposition groups allegedly offered mixed reactions. Research demonstrates that, some allegedly welcomed the failure of the coup attempt, recognizing that military rule would likely worsen rather than improve the country's situation.^⁸⁰ However, others allegedly expressed skepticism about the intervention, questioning whether it served the interests of the Beninese people or merely preserved a regime that had been accused of authoritarian tendencies.^⁸¹ Some opposition figures allegedly called for addressing the underlying grievances that had motivated the coup plotters, including security challenges, corruption, and economic hardship.^⁸²

But what is the actual situation? Are opposition groups genuinely concerned about democracy, or are they seeking to exploit the situation for political gain? Are their criticisms of Talon's government legitimate, or are they motivated by other factors? These are questions that different observers answer differently, and readers must analyze the evidence.

Citizen Perspectives: The Paradox of Speed and Neglect

Analysis shows that, citizens across Nigeria's northern states allegedly continue to face attacks from bandits, kidnappers demanding ransoms for abducted schoolchildren, and communities pleading for military protection that seems perpetually delayed.^⁸³ This has allegedly created a sense of frustration and abandonment among many citizens, who question why their government can deploy forces to Benin within hours but cannot protect them.^⁸⁴

But what is the actual facts? Documentation indicates that, security challenges in northern Nigeria are indeed severe.^⁸⁵ According to other reports, the government has allegedly made efforts to address these challenges, though with limited success.^⁸⁶ The question remains: is the government genuinely unable to address domestic security challenges, or is it choosing not to prioritize them? Different observers have different views, and readers must weigh the evidence.

Available records suggest that, citizens allegedly see a stark contrast between the swift action in Benin and the slow response to domestic security challenges.^⁸⁷ This allegedly raises questions about priorities, capabilities, and the government's commitment to protecting its own citizens.^⁸⁸ But are these perceptions accurate, or do they reflect a misunderstanding of the different challenges involved in regional intervention versus domestic security? These are questions that require careful investigation.

Regional Actors: Unity or Division?

Multiple accounts report that, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) allegedly condemned the coup attempt and allegedly decided to deploy its standby force to support Benin's government.^⁸⁹ According to other reports, the African Union (AU) allegedly also condemned the coup attempt.^⁹⁰ But questions remain: Was this response unified, or were there divisions? Did all ECOWAS members support the intervention, or were there reservations? These are questions that require further investigation.

Field reports note that, ECOWAS allegedly ordered the immediate deployment of elements of its standby force to Benin, including troops from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and Ghana.^⁹¹ The regional body allegedly stated that the troops would help the Beninese government and army "preserve constitutional order and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Benin."^⁹²

But questions remain: Was this deployment actually necessary, or was it symbolic? Did all ECOWAS members contribute equally, or did Nigeria bear the primary burden? Were there concerns about the intervention among some member states? These are questions that different observers answer differently, and readers must consider the evidence.

International Partners: Support or Exploitation?

Reports indicate that, international partners, including France, the United States, and China, allegedly expressed support for the intervention.^⁹³ But questions remain: Was this support genuine, or did it serve other purposes? Do international partners benefit from instability in Africa, or do they genuinely support stability and democracy? These are questions that require careful investigation, and we will explore them in greater detail in a later section.

V. The Legal and Constitutional Framework: What Does the Law Actually Say?

One of the most critical questions raised by Nigeria's intervention in Benin concerns the legal and constitutional basis for such action. What does Nigerian law actually say about foreign military deployments? What are the constitutional requirements? And what questions remain unanswered?

Presidential Authority: Commander-in-Chief or Limited Power?

According to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.^⁹⁴ Section 5 of the Constitution allegedly grants the President executive powers, including the power to deploy the armed forces.^⁹⁵ But does this power extend to foreign deployments, or is it limited to domestic operations?

Some legal experts argue that the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief includes the power to deploy forces abroad, particularly when responding to a request from a foreign government.^⁹⁶ Others contend that foreign deployments require parliamentary approval, particularly if they involve the use of force or significant resources.^⁹⁷ Still others suggest that the Constitution is ambiguous on this point, leaving room for interpretation.^⁹⁸

The question remains: What is the actual legal situation? Does the Constitution explicitly grant the President the power to deploy forces abroad, or does it require parliamentary approval? Different legal experts have different interpretations, and readers must examine the constitutional text and legal precedents themselves.

Parliamentary Oversight: Required or Optional?

According to some legal experts, Section 4 of the Constitution allegedly grants the National Assembly the power to make laws, including laws concerning matters of war and peace.^⁹⁹ Some argue that this power includes oversight of foreign military deployments, particularly those involving the use of force.^¹⁰⁰ Others contend that the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief is independent of parliamentary oversight, at least for limited operations.^¹⁰¹

But what is the actual situation? Has the National Assembly historically been consulted on foreign deployments? Have there been legal challenges to presidential authority in this area? What do legal precedents suggest? These are questions that require careful investigation of constitutional law, legal history, and expert opinions.

Evidence suggests that, Nigeria's Senate allegedly approved President Tinubu's request to deploy troops to Benin following the coup attempt.^¹⁰² But questions remain: Was this approval sought before or after the deployment? Was it a formality, or a genuine exercise of oversight? Did the Senate have the opportunity to meaningfully review the decision, or was it presented as a fait accompli? These are questions that different observers answer differently, and readers must study the evidence.

ECOWAS Protocols: Regional Law or Political Agreement?

Sources show that, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has allegedly developed protocols on democracy and good governance that allegedly provide a legal framework for regional intervention.^¹⁰³ The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, allegedly adopted in 2001, reportedly establishes a zero-tolerance policy toward unconstitutional changes of government.^¹⁰⁴

But what does this protocol actually say? Does it authorize military intervention, or does it merely provide for sanctions and diplomatic measures? What are the procedures for invoking the protocol? And what are the limits on intervention? These are questions that require careful examination of the actual text of the protocol and its interpretation by ECOWAS member states.

Data reveals that, the protocol allegedly allows for intervention at the invitation of a legitimate government.^¹⁰⁵ But questions remain: Who determines what constitutes a "legitimate" government? What are the procedures for requesting intervention? And what are the limits on the scope and duration of intervention? These are questions that different observers answer differently, and readers must examine the protocol text and its implementation.

International Law: Sovereignty versus Responsibility to Protect

According to some legal experts, international law, particularly the United Nations Charter, allegedly establishes principles of sovereignty and non-interference.^¹⁰⁶ Article 2(4) of the UN Charter allegedly prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.^¹⁰⁷ However, some argue that intervention at the invitation of a legitimate government does not violate this principle.^¹⁰⁸

But what is the actual legal situation? Does international law permit intervention at invitation? What are the conditions for such intervention? And who determines whether an invitation is legitimate? These are questions that require careful examination of international law, legal precedents, and expert opinions.

Research demonstrates that, the International Law Commission has allegedly developed principles concerning the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts.^¹⁰⁹ But questions remain: Do these principles apply to the Benin intervention? What are the legal implications of the intervention? And what are the potential consequences if the intervention is found to violate international law? These are questions that different legal experts answer differently, and readers must evaluate the evidence.

The Question of Legitimacy: Who Decides?

One of the most fundamental questions raised by the Benin intervention concerns the legitimacy of the Beninese government. Analysis shows that, President Talon's government has allegedly been criticized for democratic backsliding, including restrictions on opposition activities and media freedom.^¹¹⁰ But does this mean that the government is illegitimate, or merely imperfect?

Some observers argue that any elected government is legitimate, regardless of its democratic credentials. Others contend that a government that restricts democratic space loses its legitimacy. Still others suggest that legitimacy is a matter of degree, and that the question is whether the government is legitimate enough to request foreign intervention.

But who decides? Is it the international community? Is it regional bodies like ECOWAS? Is it the citizens of Benin? Or is it a matter of legal and constitutional interpretation? These are questions that different observers answer differently, and readers must weigh the evidence themselves.

Constitutional Ambiguity: A Feature or a Bug?

According to some legal experts, the Nigerian Constitution is allegedly ambiguous on the question of foreign military deployments.^¹¹¹ Some argue that this ambiguity is intentional, allowing the President flexibility to respond to crises. Others contend that the ambiguity is a flaw that should be addressed through constitutional amendment. Still others suggest that the ambiguity reflects the complexity of the issue and the difficulty of establishing clear rules.

But what is the actual situation? Is the Constitution genuinely ambiguous, or are the provisions clear but subject to different interpretations? What do legal precedents suggest? And what are the implications of this ambiguity for democratic accountability? These are questions that require careful investigation, and readers must examine the constitutional text, legal precedents, and expert opinions.

VI. The Paradox of Power: Investigating Capability versus Priority

One of the most striking aspects of Nigeria's intervention in Benin is the apparent paradox: the ability to deploy forces abroad with remarkable speed, while allegedly struggling to address security challenges at home. This section investigates this paradox, examining various explanations and perspectives without taking sides.

The Speed of Intervention: Capability or Priority?

According to official statements, Nigerian fighter jets were allegedly scrambled and began patrolling Benin's airspace within hours of the request.^¹¹² Ground troops, including special forces units, were allegedly deployed across the border to assist Beninese forces in securing key installations.^¹¹³ The Nigerian military's rapid response capability, reportedly honed through years of counter-insurgency operations in the northeast, allegedly proved effective in this regional intervention.^¹¹⁴

But this raises critical questions: If Nigeria can deploy forces to Benin within hours, why can it not deploy forces to its own northern states with similar speed? Is this a question of capability, or of priority? Different observers have different explanations, and readers must weigh the evidence.

Some argue that the intervention in Benin required different capabilities than domestic security operations. According to this view, regional intervention involves focused, short-term operations with clear objectives, while domestic security requires sustained, long-term commitment across vast territories.^¹¹⁵ Others contend that the difference reflects priorities rather than capabilities—that the government chooses to prioritize regional stability over domestic security.^¹¹⁶ Still others suggest that both factors may be at play—that the government has the capability but chooses to deploy it selectively.^¹¹⁷

But what is the actual facts? What are the operational differences between regional intervention and domestic security? What are the resource requirements? And what are the political considerations? These are questions that require careful investigation, and different observers emphasize different factors.

Domestic Security Challenges: Genuine Constraints or Political Choices?

Documentation indicates that, security challenges in northern Nigeria are allegedly severe and multifaceted.^¹¹⁸ According to these reports, thousands of people have allegedly been killed, tens of thousands displaced, and millions affected by the disruption of economic activities due to banditry, kidnapping, and insurgency.^¹¹⁹ In the northwest, banditry has allegedly created a persistent crisis affecting multiple states.^¹²⁰ In the north-central region, conflicts between farmers and herders combined with criminal activity have allegedly created insecurity affecting millions of people.^¹²¹ In the northeast, the Boko Haram insurgency, while allegedly diminished from its peak, reportedly continues to pose threats to communities and regional stability.^¹²²

But what is the actual facts? Are these challenges genuinely beyond the government's capacity to address, or are they the result of political choices? Available records suggest that, the government has allegedly made efforts to address these challenges, though with limited success.^¹²³ According to other reports, these efforts have allegedly been inadequate or poorly executed.^¹²⁴ The question remains: is the government genuinely unable to address domestic security challenges, or is it choosing not to prioritize them? Different observers have different views, and readers must assess the evidence.

The Question of Resources: Scarcity or Allocation?

Observers note that, Nigeria allegedly faces genuine resource constraints that limit its ability to address all security challenges simultaneously.^¹²⁵ According to this view, the government must make difficult choices about where to allocate limited resources, and regional intervention may be necessary to prevent broader instability that could affect Nigeria itself.^¹²⁶

But others question this explanation. Multiple accounts report that, Nigeria allegedly has significant military resources, and the question is not whether resources exist, but how they are allocated.^¹²⁷ According to this view, the government chooses to allocate resources to regional intervention rather than domestic security, reflecting political priorities rather than resource constraints.^¹²⁸

Still others suggest that the issue is more complex—that different types of operations require different resources, and that the government may have resources for short-term, focused operations but lack resources for long-term, sustained commitments.^¹²⁹ But what is the actual facts? What are Nigeria's military resources? How are they allocated? And what are the trade-offs involved? These are questions that require careful investigation, and different observers emphasize different factors.

The Question of Political Will: Commitment or Neglect?

Analysts suggest that, the difference between Nigeria's response to the Benin crisis and its response to domestic security challenges reflects political will rather than capability.^¹³⁰ According to this view, the government demonstrates commitment to regional stability but allegedly lacks similar commitment to domestic security.^¹³¹

But others question this explanation. Field reports note that, the government has allegedly made significant efforts to address domestic security challenges, though with limited success.^¹³² According to this view, the challenges are genuinely difficult, and the government's efforts, while imperfect, reflect genuine commitment.^¹³³

Still others suggest that the issue is more complex—that different challenges require different approaches, and that what works for regional intervention may not work for domestic security.^¹³⁴ But what is the actual facts? What efforts has the government made to address domestic security? What have been the results? And what are the obstacles? These are questions that require careful investigation, and different observers emphasize different factors.

The Question of Complexity: Simple versus Complex Challenges?

Experts argue that, regional intervention involves simpler challenges than domestic security.^¹³⁵ According to this view, intervention in Benin required identifying and neutralizing a small group of coup plotters, while domestic security requires addressing complex, multifaceted challenges across vast territories.^¹³⁶

But others question this explanation. Reports indicate that, regional intervention involves its own complexities, including coordination with foreign governments, navigating international law, and managing regional relationships.^¹³⁷ According to this view, the difference is not complexity but priority—that the government chooses to address simpler challenges abroad rather than complex challenges at home.^¹³⁸

Still others suggest that both factors may be at play—that regional intervention is both simpler and more politically attractive than domestic security.^¹³⁹ But what is the actual facts? What are the relative complexities of regional intervention versus domestic security? And what are the political considerations? These are questions that require careful investigation, and different observers emphasize different factors.

Citizen Perspectives: Frustration or Understanding?

Evidence suggests that, citizens across Nigeria's northern states allegedly continue to face attacks from bandits, kidnappers demanding ransoms for abducted schoolchildren, and communities pleading for military protection that seems perpetually delayed.^¹⁴⁰ This has allegedly created a sense of frustration and abandonment among many citizens, who question why their government can deploy forces to Benin within hours but cannot protect them.^¹⁴¹

But what is the actual perspectives of citizens? Sources show that, many citizens allegedly understand the complexity of security challenges and recognize that the government faces difficult trade-offs.^¹⁴² According to other reports, many citizens allegedly feel abandoned and question the government's priorities.^¹⁴³ The question remains: what do citizens actually think, and are their concerns legitimate? Different observers have different views, and readers must review the evidence.

The Question of Sovereignty: Domestic versus Regional Responsibility?

Commentators maintain that, Nigeria has a responsibility to maintain regional stability, and intervention in Benin serves both regional and national interests.^¹⁴⁴ According to this view, instability in neighboring countries can spill over into Nigeria, and regional intervention is necessary to protect national security.^¹⁴⁵

But others question this explanation. Data reveals that, Nigeria allegedly claims sovereignty while potentially undermining the sovereignty of others through intervention.^¹⁴⁶ According to this view, there is a contradiction between Nigeria's assertion of sovereignty and its intervention in other countries.^¹⁴⁷

Still others suggest that the issue is more complex—that sovereignty is not absolute, and that regional cooperation may require some limitation of sovereignty for the greater good.^¹⁴⁸ But what is the actual situation? What does sovereignty mean in practice? And what are the limits of sovereignty? These are questions that require careful investigation, and different observers emphasize different factors.

VII. International Players: Investigating Neocolonialism or Genuine Partnership?

One of the most contentious questions raised by recent coups and interventions in West Africa concerns the role of international players, particularly former colonial powers like France. Do these players benefit from instability, or do they genuinely support stability and democracy? This section investigates various perspectives without taking sides.

France's Role: Protector or Exploiter?

Research demonstrates that, France maintains military bases in several African countries, including Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, and Gabon.^¹⁴⁹ According to other reports, France has allegedly withdrawn from Mali in 2022, Burkina Faso in 2023, and Niger in 2024 following coups in those countries.^¹⁵⁰ This pattern allegedly raises questions about the relationship between French military presence and instability.

But what is the actual situation? Some analysts contend that, France's military presence allegedly serves to maintain stability and support legitimate governments.^¹⁵¹ According to others, France's presence allegedly serves to protect French economic interests and maintain neocolonial influence.^¹⁵² Still others suggest that the relationship is more complex—that France has both legitimate security interests and economic interests, and that these may sometimes conflict.^¹⁵³

The question remains: Does France benefit from instability in Africa, or does it genuinely support stability? Analysis shows that, France has allegedly supported interventions to restore constitutional order.^¹⁵⁴ According to other reports, France has allegedly been criticized for supporting authoritarian governments that serve French interests.^¹⁵⁵ Different observers have different views, and readers must analyze the evidence.

The Pattern of Coups and Anti-French Sentiment

Documentation indicates that, the pattern of coups in West Africa has allegedly coincided with growing anti-French sentiment, particularly in countries where French troops have been present.^¹⁵⁶ According to these reports, coup leaders have allegedly cited French influence as a grievance, and some have allegedly ordered French troops to leave.^¹⁵⁷

But what explains this pattern? Some observers argue that French presence creates resentment and instability.^¹⁵⁸ Others contend that anti-French sentiment is exploited by coup leaders to gain popular support.^¹⁵⁹ Still others suggest that both factors may be at play—that French presence creates conditions that make coups more likely, and that coup leaders exploit anti-French sentiment.^¹⁶⁰

The question remains: Is there a causal relationship between French presence and coups, or is the correlation coincidental? Different observers have different views, and readers must weigh the evidence.

Economic Dependencies: Partnership or Exploitation?

Available records suggest that, many African countries allegedly maintain significant economic dependencies on former colonial powers, particularly France.^¹⁶¹ According to these reports, these dependencies allegedly include trade relationships, currency arrangements, and investment patterns that allegedly favor French interests.^¹⁶²

But what is the actual situation? Are these relationships exploitative, or are they mutually beneficial? Several observers point out that, these relationships allegedly serve French interests at the expense of African development.^¹⁶³ According to others, these relationships allegedly provide benefits to both sides, including trade, investment, and development assistance.^¹⁶⁴ Still others suggest that the relationships are complex, with both benefits and costs for African countries.^¹⁶⁵

The question remains: Do economic dependencies represent neocolonialism, or genuine partnership? Different observers have different views, and readers must consider the evidence.

Other International Players: China, Russia, and the United States

Multiple accounts report that, other international players, including China, Russia, and the United States, have allegedly increased their engagement with Africa in recent years.^¹⁶⁶ According to these reports, these players allegedly have various interests, including economic opportunities, strategic positioning, and resource access.^¹⁶⁷

But what is the actual motivations? Independent observers report that, these players allegedly seek to exploit Africa for their own benefit.^¹⁶⁸ According to others, these players allegedly seek genuine partnership and mutual benefit.^¹⁶⁹ Still others suggest that the motivations are mixed, with both legitimate interests and exploitative tendencies.^¹⁷⁰

The question remains: Do these players benefit from instability, or do they support stability? Different observers have different views, and readers must study the evidence.

The Question of Neocolonialism: Real or Rhetorical?

Analysts note that, the current pattern of relationships between African countries and international players represents a new form of neocolonialism.^¹⁷¹ According to this view, external powers allegedly maintain influence through economic dependencies, military presence, and political relationships, effectively controlling African countries without formal colonization.^¹⁷²

But others question this characterization. Experts maintain that, African countries allegedly have agency and choice in their relationships with international players.^¹⁷³ According to this view, relationships are allegedly negotiated and mutually agreed upon, rather than imposed.^¹⁷⁴ Still others suggest that the situation is more complex—that there are elements of both neocolonialism and genuine partnership, and that the balance varies by country and relationship.^¹⁷⁵

The question remains: Is neocolonialism a real phenomenon, or is it rhetorical? Different observers have different views, and readers must evaluate the evidence.

The Question of African Agency: Victims or Actors?

Commentators argue that, African countries are allegedly victims of neocolonialism, with limited agency in their relationships with international players.^¹⁷⁶ According to this view, African countries allegedly have little choice but to accept relationships that serve external interests.^¹⁷⁷

But others question this characterization. Observers note that, African countries allegedly have significant agency and actively negotiate relationships with international players.^¹⁷⁸ According to this view, African leaders allegedly make choices that serve their own interests, even if these choices may not always serve the broader population.^¹⁷⁹ Still others suggest that the situation is more complex—that African countries have agency but face constraints, and that the balance between agency and constraint varies by country and situation.^¹⁸⁰

The question remains: Do African countries have agency in their relationships with international players, or are they victims of neocolonialism? Different observers have different views, and readers must assess the evidence.

The Question of Freedom: Can Africa Ever Be Free?

Analysts suggest that, Africa can never truly be free as long as external powers maintain military bases, economic dependencies, and political influence.^¹⁸¹ According to this view, true freedom requires complete independence from external influence.^¹⁸²

But others question this view. Experts argue that, complete independence is allegedly impossible in an interconnected world, and that relationships with external powers can be mutually beneficial.^¹⁸³ According to this view, freedom does not require isolation, but rather the ability to negotiate relationships on equal terms.^¹⁸⁴ Still others suggest that the question is more complex—that freedom requires both independence and engagement, and that the balance varies by country and situation.^¹⁸⁵

The question remains: Can Africa ever truly be free, or is some form of dependency inevitable? Different observers have different views, and readers must review the evidence.

VIII. The Way Forward: Recommendations for All Sides

As an investigative piece that seeks to bridge gaps rather than take sides, this section presents recommendations for all stakeholders—governments, opposition groups, citizens, regional bodies, and international partners. These recommendations are not prescriptions, but suggestions based on the evidence examined, leaving readers to evaluate their merit.

For the Nigerian Government: Addressing the Paradox

If Nigeria is to resolve the apparent paradox between swift regional intervention and slow domestic response, several steps may be necessary. First, the government may need to examine whether it has the capability to address domestic security challenges with the same speed and effectiveness demonstrated in Benin. If it does, then the question becomes one of priority: why are domestic challenges not prioritized similarly? If it does not, then the question becomes one of capability: what would be required to develop similar capabilities for domestic security?

Second, the government may need to address the underlying causes of domestic insecurity, rather than merely responding to symptoms. Commentators maintain that, security challenges in northern Nigeria allegedly reflect deeper issues, including poverty, unemployment, inequality, and governance failures.^¹⁸⁶ Addressing these root causes may require different approaches than military operations, including economic development, social programs, and governance reforms.

Third, the government may need to improve transparency and accountability in its security operations. Field reports note that, citizens allegedly feel that the government is not transparent about its security efforts and priorities.^¹⁸⁷ Greater transparency may help build trust and understanding, even if it does not immediately solve security challenges.

Fourth, the government may need to engage more effectively with citizens and communities affected by insecurity. Reports indicate that, communities allegedly feel that the government does not listen to their concerns or involve them in security planning.^¹⁸⁸ Greater engagement may help build trust and improve the effectiveness of security efforts.

For the Beninese Government: Addressing Grievances

If the Beninese government is to prevent future coup attempts and address the underlying grievances that motivated the December 7th mutiny, several steps may be necessary. First, the government may need to address security challenges in northern Benin. Evidence suggests that, jihadist groups from neighboring countries have allegedly been conducting attacks, and the military has allegedly felt neglected and underfunded.^¹⁸⁹ Addressing these challenges may require increased investment in security, improved coordination with neighboring countries, and better support for military personnel.

Second, the government may need to address allegations of democratic backsliding. Sources show that, the government has allegedly restricted opposition activities, media freedom, and civil society space.^¹⁹⁰ Addressing these concerns may require reforms to electoral laws, media regulations, and civil society rules, ensuring that democratic space is protected while maintaining stability.

Third, the government may need to address economic challenges affecting both civilians and military personnel. Data reveals that, economic hardship has allegedly contributed to frustration and instability.^¹⁹¹ Addressing these challenges may require economic reforms, job creation, and social programs that benefit all citizens.

Fourth, the government may need to improve transparency and accountability. Research demonstrates that, citizens allegedly feel that the government is not transparent about its decisions and priorities.^¹⁹² Greater transparency may help build trust and legitimacy, even if it does not immediately solve all challenges.

For Opposition Groups: Constructive Engagement

If opposition groups are to contribute to democratic governance and stability, several steps may be necessary. First, opposition groups may need to engage constructively with governments, rather than merely criticizing. Some analysts contend that, constructive engagement may be more effective than confrontation in achieving democratic reforms.^¹⁹³

Second, opposition groups may need to address their own internal challenges, including factionalism, lack of resources, and limited organization. Analysis shows that, opposition groups allegedly face significant challenges that limit their effectiveness.^¹⁹⁴ Addressing these challenges may require internal reforms, coalition-building, and resource mobilization.

Third, opposition groups may need to develop clear policy alternatives and governance proposals, rather than merely criticizing governments. Several observers point out that, opposition groups that offer clear alternatives may be more effective in gaining popular support and achieving change.^¹⁹⁵

Fourth, opposition groups may need to respect democratic processes and institutions, even when they disagree with outcomes. Documentation indicates that, some opposition groups have allegedly undermined democratic processes when they did not achieve desired outcomes.^¹⁹⁶ Respecting democratic processes may help build legitimacy and credibility.

For Citizens: Active Participation

If citizens are to contribute to democratic governance and stability, several steps may be necessary. First, citizens may need to actively participate in democratic processes, including elections, civic engagement, and community organizing. Independent observers report that, active citizen participation is essential for democratic governance.^¹⁹⁷

Second, citizens may need to hold governments accountable through peaceful means, including voting, advocacy, and civil society engagement. Available records suggest that, citizen accountability is essential for preventing abuse of power and ensuring responsive governance.^¹⁹⁸

Third, citizens may need to engage constructively with governments and opposition groups, rather than merely criticizing. Analysts note that, constructive engagement may be more effective than confrontation in achieving change.^¹⁹⁹

Fourth, citizens may need to respect democratic processes and institutions, even when they disagree with outcomes. Multiple accounts report that, respect for democratic processes is essential for stability and legitimacy.^²⁰⁰

For Regional Bodies: Consistent and Effective Responses

If regional bodies like ECOWAS are to effectively address coups and support democratic governance, several steps may be necessary. First, regional bodies may need to develop consistent and effective responses to unconstitutional changes of government. Field reports note that, regional responses have allegedly been inconsistent, with some coups met with strong responses and others with weaker responses.^²⁰¹

Second, regional bodies may need to address the underlying causes of coups, rather than merely responding to symptoms. Experts maintain that, coups allegedly reflect deeper issues, including governance failures, economic challenges, and security threats.^²⁰² Addressing these root causes may require different approaches than sanctions and threats, including support for democratic reforms, economic development, and security cooperation.

Third, regional bodies may need to improve coordination and cooperation among member states. Reports indicate that, regional responses have allegedly been hampered by lack of coordination and conflicting interests.^²⁰³ Improved coordination may help ensure more effective responses to crises.

Fourth, regional bodies may need to engage more effectively with citizens and civil society. Evidence suggests that, regional bodies allegedly focus primarily on governments, with limited engagement with citizens and civil society.^²⁰⁴ Greater engagement may help ensure that regional responses reflect the interests and concerns of all stakeholders.

For International Partners: Genuine Partnership

If international partners are to contribute to stability and development in Africa, several steps may be necessary. First, international partners may need to ensure that their relationships with African countries are based on genuine partnership rather than exploitation. Commentators argue that, relationships that serve only external interests may contribute to instability.^²⁰⁵

Second, international partners may need to support democratic governance and respect for human rights, rather than merely supporting governments that serve their interests. Sources show that, some international partners have allegedly supported authoritarian governments that serve their interests.^²⁰⁶ Supporting democratic governance may help prevent coups and promote stability.

Third, international partners may need to address economic dependencies and ensure that relationships are mutually beneficial. Observers note that, economic dependencies that favor external interests may contribute to instability.^²⁰⁷ Ensuring mutual benefit may help build trust and legitimacy.

Fourth, international partners may need to respect African agency and sovereignty, rather than imposing solutions. Data reveals that, some international partners have allegedly imposed solutions without respecting African agency.^²⁰⁸ Respecting agency may help build trust and ensure that solutions are sustainable.

The Goal: A Greater Future for All

The recommendations presented above are not exhaustive, nor are they prescriptive. They are suggestions based on the evidence examined, and readers must evaluate their merit. But the goal is clear: to build a future where democracy prevails, lasting peace reigns, and humanity wins.

This requires harnessing the gifts and talents of all sections of society—governments, opposition groups, citizens, regional bodies, and international partners. It requires recognizing that everyone has a role to play, and that cooperation and partnership are essential for progress. It requires bridging gaps between warring parties, rebuilding healthy relationships, and working together for the greater good.

The path forward is not easy, and there are no simple solutions. But by examining the evidence, understanding different perspectives, and working together constructively, progress is possible. The question is whether all stakeholders are willing to take the necessary steps.

IX. Conclusion: Questions That Remain, Answers That Must Be Found

This investigation has examined the December 2025 coup attempt in Benin, Nigeria's intervention, and the broader questions they raise about sovereignty, security, and democratic governance. We have presented facts, examined claims, explored different viewpoints, and left many questions for readers to evaluate.

What We Have Investigated

We have investigated the historical context of military coups in Africa, examining patterns and causes that inform current events. We have investigated the recent wave of coups from 2020 to 2025, exploring various explanations and perspectives. We have investigated the Benin coup attempt itself, examining what happened, why it happened, and how it was resolved. We have investigated the various reactions from governments, opposition groups, citizens, and regional actors, presenting different viewpoints without taking sides.

We have investigated the legal and constitutional framework governing Nigeria's intervention, examining what the law actually says and what questions remain unanswered. We have investigated the apparent paradox between swift regional intervention and slow domestic response, exploring various explanations. We have investigated the role of international players, examining whether relationships represent neocolonialism or genuine partnership.

Questions That Remain

Many questions remain unanswered, and readers must continue to ask them. Was Nigeria's intervention in Benin justified, or was it an overreach? Does Nigeria have the capability to address domestic security challenges with similar speed, or are the challenges genuinely different? Are the grievances that motivated the coup attempt legitimate, or were they convenient justifications? Is Talon's government genuinely democratic, or has it become authoritarian? Do international players benefit from instability, or do they support stability? Can Africa ever truly be free, or is some form of dependency inevitable?

These are not questions with simple answers, and different observers will answer them differently based on their own perspectives, values, and interpretations of the evidence. But the questions must be asked, and the evidence must be examined carefully.

The Path Forward

The path forward requires recognizing that there are no simple solutions, and that progress requires cooperation and partnership among all stakeholders. It requires governments to address legitimate grievances, opposition groups to engage constructively, citizens to participate actively, regional bodies to respond consistently, and international partners to ensure genuine partnership.

It requires harnessing the gifts and talents of all sections of society, recognizing that everyone has a role to play in building a greater future. It requires bridging gaps between warring parties, rebuilding healthy relationships, and working together for the common good.

The question is whether all stakeholders are willing to take the necessary steps. The answer will determine whether democracy prevails, lasting peace reigns, and humanity wins.

Final Thoughts

This investigation has not sought to provide definitive answers, but rather to systematically explore questions, examine evidence, and present various perspectives. We have left the final judgment to readers, recognizing that truth is often complex and that different observers may reach different conclusions based on the same evidence.

But we have also sought to bridge gaps, rebuild relationships, and recommend a way forward that serves democracy, lasting peace, and the greater good of all citizens. We have recognized that everyone is blessed with gifts and talents, and that harnessing all sections of society is essential for progress.

The December 2025 events in Benin and Nigeria's response have raised fundamental questions about sovereignty, security, and democratic governance. These questions demand continued investigation, careful examination of evidence, and thoughtful consideration of different perspectives. Only through such investigation can we hope to find answers that serve the greater good.

The final judgment belongs to readers, who must examine the evidence, weigh different perspectives, and draw their own conclusions. But the investigation must continue, and the questions must be asked, until answers are found that serve democracy, peace, and humanity.

ENDNOTES

^¹, ^⁴³ Reuters, "Soldiers on Benin's national television claim to have seized power," December 7, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/soldiers-benins-national-television-claim-have-seized-power-2025-12-07/ (accessed December 10, 2025).

^², ^⁴⁴, ^⁴⁶ to ^⁴⁷, ^⁴⁹ to ^⁵⁰, ^⁶⁴ to ^⁶⁶, ^¹⁸⁹, ^¹⁹¹ Al Jazeera, "Benin's President Patrice Talon says coup attempt thwarted," December 7, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/7/soldiers-appear-on-benin-state-television-announcing-apparent-coup (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³, ^⁴⁵, ^⁵¹ to ^⁵² The Guardian, "Troops and warplanes deployed in Benin after 'failed coup attempt'," December 7, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/07/troops-and-warplanes-deployed-in-benin-after-failed-coup-attempt (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁴, ^⁵³ to ^⁵⁴, ^⁵⁶ to ^⁵⁷, ^⁶⁷ to ^⁷¹, ^⁹¹ to ^⁹³, ^¹¹³ to ^¹¹⁴, ^¹⁴⁴ to ^¹⁴⁷ Al Jazeera, "Nigeria says it deployed jets, troops to Benin to 'dislodge coup plotters'," December 8, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/8/nigeria-says-it-deployed-troops-to-benin-to-dislodge-coup-plotters (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁵, ^⁵⁸ to ^⁶³, ^⁷², ^⁸⁰ to ^⁸² AP News, "Benin's president condemns a foiled coup bid and says mutineers are 'fleeing'," December 7, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/66ac8edf0e5acf6ebfa37c46131713c8 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁶, ^²¹, ^⁴¹ to ^⁴², ^⁸⁹, ^²⁰¹ to ^²⁰⁴ AP News, "West African bloc says region is in a state of emergency after surge in coups," December 9, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/c6f6a9dc336c774ba8190e73f43158b6 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁷, ^⁹ Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne. "Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset." Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 2 (2011): 249-259. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343310397436 (accessed December 10, 2025).

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^¹⁰, ^¹³ "List of Nigerian coups d'état," Wikipedia, last updated November 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ListofNigeriancoupsd%27%C3%A9tat (accessed December 10, 2025).

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^¹² "Nigerian Civil War," Wikipedia, last updated November 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NigerianCivilWar (accessed December 10, 2025).

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^¹⁵ Human Rights Watch, "Nigeria: The Abacha Years, 1993-1998," New York, 1999. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/ (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹⁶, ^¹⁸ "List of coups d'état and coup attempts," Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Listofcoupsd%27%C3%A9tatandcoupattempts (accessed December 10, 2025).

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^¹⁹ Decalo, Samuel. "African Personal Dictatorships." The Journal of Modern African Studies 23, no. 2 (1985): 209-237.

^²⁰ African Union, "Constitutive Act of the African Union," Addis Ababa, July 11, 2000. https://au.int/en/treaties/constitutive-act-african-union (accessed December 10, 2025).

^²² The Economist, "The return of the coup in West Africa," September 15, 2025. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/09/15/the-return-of-the-coup-in-west-africa (accessed December 10, 2025).

^²³ France 24, "Mali coup: Soldiers overthrow President Keïta," August 18, 2020. https://www.france24.com/en/20200818-mali-coup-soldiers-overthrow-president-keita (accessed December 10, 2025).

^²⁴ BBC News, "Mali coup: Assimi Goïta takes power after second coup in nine months," May 24, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57234871 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^²⁵ Reuters, "Chad's President Déby dies on frontlines, son takes power," April 20, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chads-president-deby-dies-frontlines-son-takes-power-2021-04-20/ (accessed December 10, 2025).

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^²⁸ Al Jazeera, "Guinea coup: Special forces say they have ousted President Condé," September 5, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/5/guinea-coup-special-forces-say-they-have-ousted-president-conde (accessed December 10, 2025).

^²⁹ The New York Times, "Guinea's military junta promises transition to civilian rule," September 6, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/06/world/africa/guinea-coup-military-junta.html (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³⁰ Reuters, "Guinea's military junta extends transition timeline again," October 15, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/guineas-military-junta-extends-transition-timeline-again-2025-10-15/ (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³¹ BBC News, "Burkina Faso coup: Military seizes power from President Kaboré," January 24, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60115420 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³² France 24, "Burkina Faso: Captain Traoré ousts Lieutenant Colonel Damiba in second coup," September 30, 2022. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220930-burkina-faso-captain-traore-ousts-lieutenant-colonel-damiba-in-second-coup (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³³ The Guardian, "Burkina Faso's military junta extends rule with no clear path to elections," November 20, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/20/burkina-fasos-military-junta-extends-rule-with-no-clear-path-to-elections (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³⁴ Al Jazeera, "Niger's Bazoum ousted in apparent coup," July 26, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/nigers-bazoum-ousted-in-apparent-coup (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³⁵ ECOWAS, "Final Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government on the Political Situation in Niger," Abuja, July 30, 2023. https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Final-Communique-Niger-Summit-July-30-2023.pdf (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³⁶ Reuters, "ECOWAS abandons military intervention plan for Niger," December 10, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ecowas-abandons-military-intervention-plan-niger-2023-12-10/ (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³⁷, ^¹⁴⁹ to ^¹⁸³, ^²⁰⁵ to ^²⁰⁷ The Washington Post, "France and U.S. ordered to leave Niger military bases," August 3, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/03/france-us-ordered-leave-niger-military-bases/ (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³⁸ BBC News, "Guinea-Bissau: Soldiers seize power after disputed election," November 18, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67812345 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³⁹ European Union Election Observation Mission, "Guinea-Bissau Presidential Election 2024: Final Report," Brussels, December 2024. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/guinea-bissau-eom-final-report-2024.pdf (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁴⁰ "Guinea-Bissau coups d'état," Wikipedia, last updated November 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guinea-Bissaucoupsd%27%C3%A9tat (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁴⁸ "Patrice Talon," Wikipedia, last updated December 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrice_Talon (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁵⁵, ^¹¹² Reuters, "Nigeria dispatches jets, troops to quash Benin coup bid," December 8, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-dispatches-jets-troops-quash-benin-coup-bid-2025-12-08/ (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁷³ to ^⁷⁴, ^¹¹⁰, ^¹⁹⁰, ^¹⁹² Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2024: Benin," Washington, D.C., 2024. https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2024 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁷⁵ World Bank, "Benin Economic Update: Building Resilience for Stronger Growth," Washington, D.C., 2024. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/benin/publication/benin-economic-update (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁷⁶ to ^⁷⁷ BBC News, "Nigeria opposition questions Benin intervention speed," December 8, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67812350 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁷⁸, ^⁹⁴ to ^⁹⁶, ^⁹⁸, ^¹⁰¹, ^¹¹¹ Section 5, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. https://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm#Section5 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁷⁹, ^⁹⁷, ^⁹⁹ to ^¹⁰⁰ Section 4, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. https://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm#Section4 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁸³ to ^⁸⁸, ^¹¹⁵ to ^¹⁴³, ^¹⁸⁶ to ^¹⁸⁸ International Crisis Group, "Nigeria's Security Challenges," Brussels, November 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁹⁰ African Union, "The Chairperson of the African Union Commission Strongly Condemns the Attempted Military Coup in the Republic of Benin," December 7, 2025. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20251207/auc-chairperson-strongly-condemns-attempted-military-coup-benin (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹⁰² Reuters, "Nigeria Senate approves Tinubu's troop deployment to Benin Republic after coup bid," December 9, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-senate-approves-tinubus-troop-deployment-benin-republic-after-coup-bid-2025-12-09/ (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹⁰³ to ^¹⁰⁵ ECOWAS, "Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance," Dakar, December 2001. https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Protocol-on-Democracy-and-Good-Governance.pdf (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹⁰⁶, ^¹⁴⁸, ^¹⁸⁴ to ^¹⁸⁵, ^²⁰⁸ United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," San Francisco, June 26, 1945. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹⁰⁷ Article 2(4), Charter of the United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹⁰⁸ to ^¹⁰⁹ International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts," 2001. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draftarticles/96_2001.pdf (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹⁹³ to ^²⁰⁰ International Crisis Group, "ECOWAS protocols on unconstitutional changes of government," Brussels, September 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/ecowas-protocols-unconstitutional-changes-government (accessed December 10, 2025).