THE REAL COUP IN BENIN: DID PATRICE TALON SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROY AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC MODEL?

Introduction: The Question That Demands Investigation

In the early hours of December 7, 2025, chaos erupted in Cotonou, Benin Republic. According to multiple news reports, eight soldiers stormed the national television station, declaring the dissolution of President Patrice Talon's government.^¹ Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri, speaking for the self-proclaimed Military Committee for Refoundation, allegedly cited deteriorating security in northern Benin and the neglect of fallen soldiers as justification for the takeover.^² Within hours, according to official statements, Nigerian fighter jets were in the air, ground troops were crossing the border, and by evening, President Talon appeared on state television declaring the situation "completely under control."^³

But this investigation asks a different question: Was the real coup in Benin not the December 7th mutiny, but rather the systematic dismantling of democratic institutions that allegedly occurred under Patrice Talon's presidency? Did Talon, who came to power in 2016 promising reform and democracy, allegedly systematically destroy what many observers considered Africa's model democracy?^⁴

This investigative article does not seek to provide definitive answers, but rather to systematically examine the evidence, explore various perspectives, and allow readers to draw their own conclusions. It investigates Patrice Talon's rise to power, the electoral reforms that allegedly restricted democratic competition, the opposition's exclusion from presidential elections, the alleged restrictions on media freedom and civil society, and the security challenges that may have contributed to military frustration. It examines whether these developments represent democratic backsliding or necessary reforms for stability and development.

The investigation considers multiple perspectives: those who argue that Talon has destroyed democracy, those who contend that his reforms were necessary for development, and those who suggest that the situation is more complex than either narrative suggests. It asks whether the December 7th coup attempt was a response to genuine grievances or an opportunistic power grab, and whether it exposed deeper questions about the state of democracy in Benin and across Africa.

Throughout this article, we will present facts, examine claims, explore different viewpoints, and leave the final judgment to the reader. Our goal is not to take sides, but to expose the truth systematically, bridge gaps between warring parties, and recommend a way forward that serves democracy, lasting peace, and the greater good of all citizens.

I. Benin's Democratic Heritage: The Model That Once Was

To understand whether Patrice Talon allegedly destroyed Benin's democratic model, we must first investigate what that model was. This section examines Benin's democratic history, its reputation as a model democracy, and the institutions that allegedly made it exemplary.

The Democratic Transition: From Military Rule to Pluralism

Historical records show that Benin experienced a remarkable democratic transition in the early 1990s.^⁵ After decades of military rule and Marxist-Leninist dictatorship under Mathieu Kérékou, Benin allegedly held a National Conference in 1990 that brought together various political and social groups to chart a new democratic path.^⁶ This conference, observers note, set a precedent for democratic transitions across Africa.^⁷

The transition allegedly resulted in a new constitution, multiparty elections, and the peaceful transfer of power.^⁸ In 1991, Nicéphore Soglo allegedly became Benin's first democratically elected president, defeating Kérékou in what many observers considered a free and fair election.^⁹ In 1996, Kérékou allegedly returned to power through democratic elections, and in 2001, he allegedly won re-election.^¹⁰ In 2006, Boni Yayi allegedly won the presidency, and in 2016, Patrice Talon allegedly succeeded him.^¹¹

Observers argue that this pattern of peaceful transfers of power, competitive elections, and respect for constitutional term limits made Benin a model democracy in Africa.^¹² But what were the real situation? Were elections genuinely free and fair, or were they merely more democratic than those in neighboring countries? Different observers have different views, and readers must examine the evidence.

The Reputation: Africa's Model Democracy

Reports indicate that Benin gained a reputation as one of Africa's most stable and democratic countries.^¹³ International observers allegedly praised Benin's democratic institutions, peaceful transfers of power, and respect for constitutional norms.^¹⁴ Evidence suggests that Freedom House rated Benin as "Free" for many years, with scores reaching 82 out of 100 in 2017.^¹⁵ The country allegedly ranked highly on various democracy indices.^¹⁶

But what were the actual facts? Observers note that Benin's reputation may have been overstated, and that the country faced significant challenges even before Talon's presidency.^¹⁷ Others contend that Benin was genuinely a model democracy, and that Talon's presidency marked a significant departure from this tradition.^¹⁸ The question remains: Was Benin truly a model democracy, or was it merely better than its neighbors? Different observers reach different conclusions, and readers must weigh the evidence.

The Institutions: What Made Benin Democratic?

Analysts suggest that Benin's democratic model rested on several key institutions: competitive multiparty elections, an independent judiciary, a free press, active civil society, and respect for constitutional term limits.^¹⁹ But what were the real state of these institutions? Reports indicate that these institutions functioned relatively well, though not perfectly.^²⁰ Some argue that these institutions faced significant challenges, including corruption, weak capacity, and political interference.^²¹

The central question is: What were the actual strengths and weaknesses of Benin's democratic institutions before Talon's presidency? And how did these institutions allegedly change under Talon? These are questions that require careful investigation, and different observers emphasize different factors.

The Period of Stability: Zero Coups for Half a Century

Historical evidence indicates that Benin allegedly experienced its last successful military coup on October 26, 1972, when Major Mathieu Kérékou seized power.^²² For the next 53 years, until December 7, 2025, Benin allegedly experienced no successful coups, making it one of the most stable countries in West Africa.^²³ This period of stability allegedly coincided with the democratic transition and the establishment of democratic institutions.^²⁴

But what explains this stability? Experts indicate that Benin's democratic institutions prevented military intervention by providing legitimate channels for political change.^²⁵ Critics suggest that stability may have reflected other factors, including economic conditions, regional dynamics, or simply the absence of military ambition.^²⁶ This raises the question: Was Benin's stability due to its democratic institutions, or to other factors? Different perspectives exist, and readers must evaluate the evidence themselves.

II. Enter Patrice Talon (2016): The "Businessman Reformer"

To understand whether Patrice Talon allegedly destroyed Benin's democratic model, we must investigate how he came to power and what he promised. This section examines Talon's background, his 2016 election campaign, and the promises he allegedly made to the Beninese people.

The Businessman: From Cotton to Politics

Biographical sources indicate that Patrice Talon allegedly built a business empire in cotton, earning him the nickname "King of Cotton."^²⁷ Reports indicate that Talon became one of Benin's wealthiest individuals through his cotton trading business.^²⁸ But what do the facts reveal about the nature of his business activities? Some analysts contend that Talon's business success reflected legitimate entrepreneurship.^²⁹ Supporters maintain that his business activities involved close relationships with political leaders and potentially questionable practices.^³⁰

The central question is: Did Talon's business background prepare him for democratic leadership, or did it create conflicts of interest? Different observers reach different conclusions, and readers must weigh the evidence.

The 2016 Election: Promises of Reform

Election reports indicate that Patrice Talon won the 2016 presidential election, defeating Prime Minister Lionel Zinsou in a runoff.^³¹ Multiple sources indicate that Talon's campaign focused on promises of anti-corruption, modernization, and critically, a single term limit.^³² Talon promised to serve only one term and then step down, addressing concerns about presidential overreach.^³³

But what were the actual circumstances of the 2016 election? Observers maintain that the election was genuinely competitive and free.^³⁴ Opponents argue that the election involved irregularities or manipulation.^³⁵ The fundamental question is: Was the 2016 election genuinely free and fair, or were there problems that were overlooked? Views differ, and readers must assess the evidence independently.

The Promise: A Single Term

Some evidence suggests that Patrice Talon promised during his 2016 campaign that he would serve only one term as president.^³⁶ This promise allegedly addressed concerns about presidential overreach and demonstrated his commitment to democratic norms.^³⁷ However, analysts note that Talon later changed his position, suggesting that he might seek a second term.^³⁸

This raises the question: Was Talon's promise of a single term genuine, or was it a campaign strategy? And if he changed his position, what does this reveal about his commitment to democratic norms? These are questions that require careful investigation.

Early Signs: Consolidating Power

Available data shows that shortly after taking office in 2016, Patrice Talon began taking actions that some observers interpreted as signs of authoritarian tendencies.^³⁹ These reports indicate that Talon began consolidating power, appointing close associates to key positions, and taking steps to control key institutions.^⁴⁰

But were these actions genuinely signs of authoritarianism, or were they normal political behavior? Critics argue that Talon's early actions reflected a desire to implement reforms and address corruption.^⁴¹ Proponents suggest that these actions represented the beginning of a systematic effort to consolidate power.^⁴² This begs the question: Were Talon's early actions signs of what was to come, or were they misinterpreted? Opinions vary, and readers must carefully examine the evidence.

The Judiciary: Capturing the Referee

One of the most critical questions in this investigation concerns Talon's alleged capture of the judiciary. Reports indicate that shortly after taking office, Talon appointed his personal lawyer, Joseph Djogbénou, first as Minister of Justice in 2016, and then as President of the Constitutional Court in 2018.^⁴³ Supporters contend that this gave Talon control over both the rules and the referee, allowing him to change electoral laws and ensure favorable interpretations.^⁴⁴

But what does the evidence show about the significance of these appointments? Experts argue that these appointments represented a conflict of interest and compromised judicial independence.^⁴⁵ Some contend that these appointments reflected legitimate choices based on qualifications and expertise.^⁴⁶ The critical question is: Did these appointments genuinely compromise judicial independence, or were they legitimate? Perspectives differ, and readers must review the evidence to draw their own conclusions.

The Constitutional Court: Interpreting Laws to Favor the Government

After Djogbénou became President of the Constitutional Court, the court allegedly issued rulings that favored the government. The court allegedly upheld the 2018 electoral code reforms, dismissed challenges to the 2021 presidential election requirements, and interpreted constitutional provisions in ways that supported Talon's agenda.^⁴⁷ Critics argue that these rulings demonstrated the court's lack of independence.^⁴⁸ Supporters maintain that the rulings were based on legitimate legal interpretation.^⁴⁹

But what does the record actually show? Some observers argue that the Constitutional Court's rulings consistently favored the government, suggesting that judicial independence had been compromised.^⁵⁰ Others contend that the rulings were based on legitimate legal reasoning, and that critics simply disagreed with the court's interpretation of the law.^⁵¹ The key question is: Did the Constitutional Court genuinely lose its independence, or did it simply interpret the law in ways that happened to favor the government? Different perspectives exist, and readers must evaluate the evidence themselves.

The Impact: Judicial Capture and Democratic Erosion

If the judiciary was captured, what was the impact on democracy? Critics argue that judicial capture allowed Talon to change electoral laws, eliminate opposition, and maintain power without effective checks.^⁵² They contend that without an independent judiciary, there was no institution capable of checking executive power.^⁵³ Supporters maintain that the judiciary continued to function independently, and that critics simply disagreed with its rulings.^⁵⁴

The fundamental question is: What is the actual impact of judicial capture on democracy? Observers disagree, and readers must examine the evidence to form their own conclusions. But most observers agree that an independent judiciary is essential for democracy, and that judicial capture represents a serious threat to democratic institutions.

III. The 2018 Electoral Laws: Democracy Dismantled by Mathematics?

One of the most critical questions in this investigation concerns the 2018 electoral code reforms. Some note that these reforms allegedly used mathematical precision to eliminate opposition parties from electoral competition. This section investigates what these reforms actually did, how they allegedly affected democratic competition, and whether they were justified.

The New Electoral Code: A Systematic Exclusion?

But what were the actual content of these reforms? Experts suggest that these reforms made it nearly impossible for opposition parties to qualify for elections.^⁴⁹ Others argue that these reforms were necessary to reduce party fragmentation and improve governance.^⁵⁰ The essential question is: What did these reforms actually do, and were they justified? Interpretations vary, and readers must analyze the evidence themselves.

The Certificate of Conformity: A Tool for Exclusion?

Evidence suggests that the new electoral code required political parties to obtain a "certificate of conformity" from the interior ministry.^⁵¹ Analysts indicate that this requirement gave the government control over which parties could participate in elections.^⁵² These observers argue that the interior ministry could deny certificates to opposition parties, effectively excluding them from electoral competition.^⁵³

But what was the real purpose of this requirement? Some analysts contend that the certificate requirement was necessary to ensure that parties met legal standards.^⁵⁴ Critics suggest that the requirement was designed to exclude opposition parties.^⁵⁵ This leads to the question: Was the certificate requirement a legitimate tool for ensuring party compliance, or was it a tool for exclusion? Observers have contrasting views, and readers must evaluate the evidence.

The Filing Fees: A Financial Barrier?

Sources show that the new electoral code raised filing fees to approximately $427,000.^⁵⁶ Observers maintain that this fee was prohibitively high for most opposition parties, effectively excluding them from electoral competition.^⁵⁷ They maintain that only parties with significant financial resources, including those aligned with the government, could afford to participate.^⁵⁸

But what were the actual purpose of these fees? Some critics argue that the fees were necessary to cover the costs of elections and to ensure that only serious parties participated.^⁵⁹ Some supporters maintain that the fees were designed to exclude opposition parties.^⁶⁰ The core question is: Were the filing fees a legitimate requirement, or were they a tool for exclusion? Different interpretations exist, and readers must examine the evidence carefully.

The Membership Requirements: Raising the Bar?

Research reveals that the new electoral code increased party membership requirements more than tenfold.^⁶¹ Supporters contend that this requirement made it nearly impossible for smaller opposition parties to qualify.^⁶² These analysts suggest that only large, well-established parties, including those aligned with the government, could meet the requirements.^⁶³

But what is the real purpose of these requirements? Some analysts argue that the requirements were necessary to ensure that parties had genuine popular support.^⁶⁴ Opponents argue that the requirements were designed to exclude opposition parties.^⁶⁵ This begs the question: Were the membership requirements legitimate, or were they a tool for exclusion? Views differ, and readers must assess the evidence independently.

The 10% Threshold: A Mathematical Elimination?

Multiple sources indicate that the new electoral code added a 10% national vote threshold for parliamentary seats.^⁶⁶ Analysts note that this threshold meant that parties needed to win at least 10% of the national vote to gain any parliamentary representation.^⁶⁷ They contend that this threshold effectively eliminated smaller parties from parliament.^⁶⁸

But what was the actual purpose of this threshold? Observers suggest that the threshold was necessary to reduce party fragmentation and improve governance.^⁶⁹ Proponents suggest that the threshold was designed to exclude opposition parties.^⁷⁰ The central question is: Was the threshold a legitimate tool for improving governance, or was it a tool for exclusion? Different observers reach different conclusions, and readers must weigh the evidence.

The 2019 Parliamentary Elections: Zero Opposition Parties

Some evidence suggests that when the 2019 parliamentary elections were held under the new electoral code, zero opposition parties qualified to participate.^⁷¹ These sources show that the ballot featured only two parties: Talon's Party A and Talon's Party B, both aligned with the government.^⁷² Experts indicate that turnout collapsed to approximately 27%, and protests were violently suppressed.^⁷³

Observers maintain that this parliament, with 88 seats, was 100% pro-Talon.^⁷⁴ Others contend that the elections were legitimate, and that opposition parties simply failed to meet the requirements.^⁷⁵ The critical question is: Did the 2019 elections represent the elimination of opposition through legal means, or were they a legitimate exercise in electoral reform? Opinions vary, and readers must carefully examine the evidence.

The Aftermath: A Parliament Without Opposition

The 2019 elections allegedly resulted in a parliament that was completely controlled by Talon's supporters. This parliament allegedly passed constitutional amendments, electoral calendar changes, and further entrenchment of power.^⁷⁶ Critics argue that without opposition representation, there was no check on executive power.^⁷⁷ Supporters maintain that the parliament represented the will of the voters, even if turnout was low.^⁷⁸

The essential question is: Can a parliament without opposition representation genuinely serve democratic functions? Perspectives differ, and readers must review the evidence to draw their own conclusions.

International Reactions: Condemnation and Concern

The 2019 elections allegedly drew condemnation from international observers and human rights organizations.^⁷⁹ Freedom House allegedly downgraded Benin from "Free" to "Partly Free" in 2020, citing the elimination of opposition from parliament.^⁸⁰ The European Union allegedly expressed concern about democratic backsliding.^⁸¹

But what was the actual impact of international condemnation? Supporters argue that international observers misunderstood the reforms.^⁸² Critics contend that international pressure was insufficient to reverse the democratic backsliding.^⁸³ This leads to the question: Did international condemnation have any meaningful impact, or was it merely symbolic? Interpretations vary, and readers must analyze the evidence themselves.

IV. Blocking the Presidency Itself: The 2021 Election

If the 2018 electoral laws allegedly eliminated opposition from parliament, the 2021 presidential election allegedly blocked opposition from the presidency itself. This section investigates the new requirements introduced for presidential candidates, the disqualification and imprisonment of opposition leaders, and the election that allegedly had no real challengers.

The New Requirements: Endorsements from Loyalists

Sources show that for the 2021 presidential election, Patrice Talon introduced a new requirement: presidential candidates had to receive endorsements from 10% of members of parliament and mayors.^⁸⁵ Experts note that since all members of parliament and most mayors were loyal to Talon, this requirement made it impossible for opposition candidates to qualify.^⁸⁶

But what was the actual purpose of this requirement? Some analysts suggest that the requirement was necessary to ensure that candidates had genuine support from elected officials.^⁸⁷ Proponents maintain that the requirement was designed to exclude opposition candidates.^⁸⁸ This begs the question: Was the endorsement requirement legitimate, or was it a tool for exclusion? Opinions vary, and readers must carefully examine the evidence.

Opposition Leaders: Disqualification, Exile, and Imprisonment

Research reveals that in the lead-up to the 2021 presidential election, opposition leaders faced various forms of exclusion.^⁸⁹ This documentation reveals that some opposition leaders were disqualified from running, some went into exile, and some were imprisoned.^⁹⁰

Documentation indicates that Reckya Madougou, a prominent opposition leader, was sentenced to 20 years in prison for "terrorism" in connection with the 2021 election.^⁹³ Some analysts contend that these charges were fabricated to prevent her from running for president.^⁹⁴ Other reports indicate that Prof. Joël Aïvo, another opposition leader, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for "money laundering."^⁹⁵ Experts maintain that these charges were fabricated.^⁹⁶

The core question is: Were these imprisonments legitimate responses to criminal activity, or were they tools for political exclusion? Observers have contrasting views, and readers must evaluate the evidence.

The 2021 Election: No Real Challengers

Multiple sources indicate that the 2021 presidential election had a turnout of approximately 26%, though the official figure was reported as 50%.^¹⁰⁴ Critics note that Patrice Talon won with 86% of the vote in an election with no real challengers.^¹⁰⁵ They maintain that the election was not genuinely competitive.^¹⁰⁶

But what were the actual circumstances? Supporters argue that the election was legitimate, and that opposition candidates simply failed to meet the requirements.^¹⁰⁷ Opponents contend that the requirements were designed to ensure that only Talon could qualify.^¹⁰⁸ The question remains: Did the 2021 election represent the blocking of opposition through legal means, or was it a legitimate exercise in electoral requirements? Different interpretations exist, and readers must examine the evidence carefully.

The Campaign: An Election Without Competition

The 2021 presidential campaign allegedly featured only Talon as a viable candidate. Opposition leaders were allegedly disqualified, in exile, or in prison.^¹⁰⁹ The campaign allegedly lacked genuine debate or competition.^¹¹⁰ Critics argue that this represented the end of competitive presidential elections in Benin.^¹¹¹

But what explains the low turnout? Some observers argue that low turnout reflected voter apathy and lack of genuine choice.^¹¹² Others contend that it reflected fear of reprisal or disillusionment with the political process.^¹¹³ The central question is: What does low turnout reveal about the state of democracy? Different observers have different views, and readers must examine the evidence.

The Results: Victory Without Contest

Talon's victory with 86% of the vote in an election with no real challengers allegedly demonstrated the success of systematic exclusion.^¹¹⁴ Critics argue that the election was a sham, designed to create an appearance of legitimacy while maintaining authoritarian control.^¹¹⁵ Supporters maintain that the election was legitimate, and that Talon's victory reflected popular support.^¹¹⁶

This raises the question: Can an election with no real challengers be considered democratic? Different observers reach different conclusions, and readers must weigh the evidence.

V. Tightening the Authoritarian Grip (2021-2023): Media, Civil Society, and Public Fear

If electoral laws allegedly eliminated opposition from elections, what happened to other democratic institutions? This section investigates the alleged restrictions on media freedom, the crackdown on civil society, and the climate of fear that allegedly replaced public debate.

Media Freedom: A Systematic Crackdown?

Some evidence suggests that between 2021 and 2023, Benin dropped 43 places in global press freedom rankings.^¹¹³ They maintain that this drop reflected a systematic crackdown on media freedom.^¹¹⁴ The data indicates that media outlets were shut down, and journalists were arrested.^¹¹⁵

But what explains this decline? Supporters argue that media restrictions were necessary to combat fake news and maintain stability.^¹¹⁶ Critics contend that the restrictions were designed to silence criticism of the government.^¹¹⁷ The key question is: Were media restrictions legitimate responses to misinformation, or were they tools for silencing dissent? Different perspectives exist, and readers must evaluate the evidence themselves.

Civil Society: Restricted and Silenced?

Reports indicate that civil society organizations faced increasing restrictions under Talon's presidency.^¹¹⁸ Some organizations were allegedly forced to re-register under new, more restrictive rules.^¹¹⁹ Strikes and protests were allegedly banned or severely limited.^¹²⁰

But what was the actual purpose of these restrictions? Supporters argue that they were necessary to maintain order and prevent destabilization.^¹²¹ Critics contend that they were designed to silence opposition voices.^¹²² The fundamental question is: Were civil society restrictions legitimate responses to security concerns, or were they tools for silencing dissent? Observers disagree, and readers must examine the evidence to form their own conclusions.

Public Fear: Replacing Public Debate

Observers note that after protesters were killed in 2021, street demonstrations largely stopped.^¹²³ They contend that public fear replaced public debate, and that citizens became afraid to express dissenting views.^¹²⁴

But what explains this climate of fear? Supporters argue that it reflected respect for law and order.^¹²⁵ Critics contend that it reflected systematic intimidation and repression.^¹²⁶ This begs the question: Did public fear result from legitimate law enforcement, or from systematic intimidation? Views differ, and readers must assess the evidence independently.

The Economic Dimension: Growth Amidst Repression

While democratic institutions allegedly were being restricted, Benin's economy allegedly continued to grow. Reports indicate that GDP growth reached 5.5% in 2023, and the country allegedly became Africa's top cotton producer.^¹²⁷ Supporters argue that economic success justified democratic restrictions.^¹²⁸ Critics contend that economic growth masked democratic decay.^¹²⁹

Observers note that behind the economic numbers, freedom was shrinking in Benin.^¹³⁰ They contend that while the government touted economic success, democratic space was being systematically restricted.^¹³¹ These observers argue that the country was becoming less free, even as it became more prosperous.^¹³²

But what was the actual relationship between economic growth and freedom? Experts suggest that economic growth and freedom can coexist, and one should not be sacrificed for the other.^¹³³ Opponents argue that economic development may require some restrictions on freedom.^¹³⁴ The essential question is: Can economic growth and freedom coexist, or must one be sacrificed for the other? Interpretations vary, and readers must analyze the evidence themselves.

The International Response: Condemnation Without Action

International observers allegedly condemned Benin's democratic backsliding, but their response allegedly was insufficient to reverse the trend.^¹³⁵ Freedom House downgraded Benin from "Free" to "Partly Free" in 2020, and to "Not Free" in 2023.^¹³⁶ The European Union allegedly expressed concern but took no meaningful action.^¹³⁷

But what explains the limited international response? Some observers argue that international actors prioritized stability over democracy.^¹³⁸ Others contend that Benin's small size and limited strategic importance meant that international pressure was minimal.^¹³⁹ The critical question is: Why did international condemnation fail to reverse democratic backsliding? Opinions vary, and readers must carefully examine the evidence.

VI. The Northern Security Crisis: Neglected Soldiers and Growing Frustration

While democratic institutions allegedly were being restricted, northern Benin allegedly faced a growing security crisis. This section investigates the jihadist threat, the military's alleged neglect, and the grievances that may have contributed to the December 2025 mutiny.

The Jihadist Threat: Spreading Southward

Multiple sources indicate that since 2019, jihadist groups have advanced southward from Burkina Faso and Niger into northern Benin.^¹⁴⁸ Analysts indicate that these groups have conducted numerous attacks on civilians, security forces, and infrastructure.^¹⁴⁹ These reports indicate that the security situation has deteriorated significantly, with attacks increasing in frequency and intensity.^¹⁵⁰

But what was the actual security situation? Some analysts argue that the military's grievances are legitimate, and the government has failed to adequately support soldiers fighting in the north.^¹⁵¹ Others contend that the security crisis has been exaggerated to justify authoritarian measures.^¹⁵² The essential question is: What is the actual security situation, and how has the government responded? Perspectives differ, and readers must review the evidence to draw their own conclusions.

Military Neglect: The Grievances of Fallen Soldiers

Multiple sources indicate that in one year, northern Benin experienced 182 attacks by jihadist groups.^¹⁵³ Some maintain that these attacks resulted in significant casualties among civilians and security forces.^¹⁵⁴ The evidence suggests that attacks on civilians increased by 75%, and thousands of people were displaced.^¹⁵⁵

But what were the actual facts? Observers suggest that the government has failed to adequately support fallen soldiers and their families.^¹⁵⁶ They contend that soldiers fighting in the north allegedly lacked adequate equipment, support, and recognition.^¹⁵⁷ This leads to the question: Did the government genuinely neglect the military, or were resources limited by other priorities? Interpretations vary, and readers must analyze the evidence themselves.

The Connection: Security Crisis and Democratic Restrictions

But is there actually a connection? Opponents argue that security challenges can justify some restrictions on democracy, but that Talon allegedly used the security crisis as a pretext for authoritarian measures.^¹⁵⁸ Supporters maintain that the security crisis required strong leadership and that democratic restrictions were necessary for stability.^¹⁵⁹

The core question is: Did the security crisis genuinely require democratic restrictions, or was it used as a pretext for authoritarianism? Observers have contrasting views, and readers must evaluate the evidence.

Military Frustration: The Grievances That Led to Mutiny

The military's alleged frustration with the government's handling of the security crisis allegedly contributed to the December 2025 mutiny. Soldiers allegedly felt that their sacrifices were not recognized, that their equipment was inadequate, and that their fallen comrades were neglected.^¹⁶⁰ The mutineers allegedly cited "the disregard and neglect of our fallen brothers-in-arms" as a key grievance.^¹⁶¹

But what were the actual circumstances? Some observers argue that military grievances were legitimate, and that the government failed to adequately support soldiers fighting in the north.^¹⁶² Others contend that military grievances were exaggerated, and that the mutiny was opportunistic.^¹⁶³ The question remains: Were military grievances legitimate, or were they opportunistic? Different interpretations exist, and readers must examine the evidence carefully.

The Regional Context: Jihadist Expansion Across West Africa

Benin's security crisis occurred against a backdrop of jihadist expansion across West Africa. Since 2015, jihadist groups have allegedly advanced from Mali into Burkina Faso, Niger, and now Benin.^¹⁶⁴ The regional response has allegedly been fragmented, with some countries experiencing successful coups and others maintaining democratic institutions.^¹⁶⁵

But what explains this regional pattern? Some observers argue that jihadist expansion reflects state weakness and governance failures.^¹⁶⁶ Others contend that it reflects external factors, including the legacy of colonialism and ongoing foreign intervention.^¹⁶⁷ The central question is: What explains the regional pattern of jihadist expansion and democratic instability? Different observers have different views, and readers must examine the evidence.

The Sahel Crisis: A Regional Security Challenge

The Sahel region has allegedly become one of the most unstable regions in the world, with jihadist groups controlling large swathes of territory and launching attacks across borders.^¹⁶⁸ The regional response has allegedly been fragmented, with some countries relying on French military support, others turning to Russian mercenaries, and still others attempting to address the crisis through regional cooperation.^¹⁶⁹

But what explains the failure of regional cooperation? Some observers argue that regional organizations like ECOWAS lack the capacity and political will to address the crisis effectively.^¹⁷⁰ Others contend that external powers, particularly France, have undermined regional cooperation by maintaining military bases and economic dependencies.^¹⁷¹ This raises the question: Why has regional cooperation failed to address the Sahel crisis, and what does this reveal about the prospects for regional stability? Different observers reach different conclusions, and readers must weigh the evidence.

The French Factor: Neocolonialism or Necessary Partnership?

France's role in West Africa has allegedly been a subject of intense debate. Some observers argue that France maintains neocolonial relationships through military bases, economic dependencies, and political influence.^¹⁷² They contend that France benefits from instability and uses it to justify its continued presence.^¹⁷³ Others maintain that France provides necessary security support and that its presence is welcomed by regional governments.^¹⁷⁴

But what is the actual role of France? Some observers argue that France's military intervention in Mali and other countries has failed to address the root causes of instability.^¹⁷⁵ Others contend that France's withdrawal from Mali and Niger has created a security vacuum that jihadist groups have exploited.^¹⁷⁶ The key question is: What is France's actual role in West Africa, and is it a force for stability or instability? Different perspectives exist, and readers must evaluate the evidence themselves.

The Russian Alternative: A New Form of Dependence?

As some countries have turned away from France, they have allegedly turned to Russia for security support. Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group have allegedly been deployed in Mali and other countries, raising questions about a new form of dependence.^¹⁷⁷ Some observers argue that Russia provides an alternative to French neocolonialism.^¹⁷⁸ Others contend that Russia represents a new form of authoritarian influence that undermines democracy.^¹⁷⁹

But what explains the appeal of Russian support? Some observers argue that Russia offers security support without the political conditions that France and other Western powers impose.^¹⁸⁰ Others contend that Russia's support comes with its own conditions, including support for authoritarian governments and opposition to democratic norms.^¹⁸¹ The fundamental question is: Does Russia represent a genuine alternative to French influence, or does it represent a new form of dependence? Observers disagree, and readers must examine the evidence to form their own conclusions.

VII. The Illusion of Reform (2022-2023): Managed Democracy or Genuine Opening?

After years of alleged democratic backsliding, Talon allegedly made strategic "concessions" between 2022 and 2023. This section investigates whether these concessions represented genuine democratic opening or managed democracy designed to create an illusion of reform.

Strategic Concessions: An Illusion of Reform?

Supporters contend that between 2022 and 2023, Patrice Talon made strategic "concessions" that created an illusion of democratic opening.^¹⁶⁰ They argue that these concessions were designed to appease international observers while maintaining authoritarian control.^¹⁶¹

But what were these concessions? Available data shows that during this period, the government allowed the main opposition party to legally operate.^¹⁶² They permitted seven parties to run in the 2023 elections.^¹⁶³ Opposition parties allegedly won 28 out of 109 parliamentary seats.^¹⁶⁴

But what do the facts reveal about the significance of these gains? Critics argue that Talon's party still held 81 seats, more than the two-thirds needed to change the constitution at will.^¹⁶⁵ They contend that opposition gains were meaningless, as the government still had complete control.^¹⁶⁶

This begs the question: Did the 2022-2023 concessions represent genuine democratic opening, or were they managed democracy designed to create an illusion of reform? Views differ, and readers must assess the evidence independently.

The 2023 Elections: Opposition Gains or Cosmetic Changes?

The evidence indicates that in the 2023 elections, opposition parties won 28 out of 109 parliamentary seats.^¹⁹⁷ Some observers argue that this represented a significant democratic opening.^¹⁹⁸ Others contend that the gains were cosmetic, as Talon's party still held 81 seats, more than the two-thirds majority needed to change the constitution.^¹⁹⁹

Experts note that the majority means that the government can change the constitution at will, making opposition representation meaningless.^²⁰¹ Proponents maintain that the majority is legitimate, as it reflects the will of the voters.^²⁰² This leads to the question: Does the two-thirds majority make opposition representation meaningless, or is it legitimate? Observers have contrasting views, and readers must evaluate the evidence.

Managed Democracy: Democracy on Paper, Authoritarianism in Practice

They suggest that the 2023 elections represented "managed democracy" - democracy on paper, but authoritarianism in practice.^²⁰³ They contend that the elections created an appearance of democracy while maintaining authoritarian control.^²⁰⁴ These observers argue that the opposition gains were cosmetic, designed to create an illusion of democracy.^²⁰⁵

The critical question is: Is managed democracy better than no democracy, or is it a more sophisticated form of authoritarianism? Opinions vary, and readers must carefully examine the evidence.

The International Response: Praising Managed Democracy

Some international observers allegedly praised the 2023 elections as a sign of democratic opening.^²⁰⁶ They allegedly welcomed the return of opposition parties to parliament and the increase in political competition.^²⁰⁷ But critics argue that international observers were deceived by the appearance of democracy, and that they failed to recognize that opposition gains were meaningless given the government's two-thirds majority.^²⁰⁸

But what explains the international response? Some observers argue that international actors were eager to see signs of democratic progress and were willing to accept managed democracy as better than no democracy.^²⁰⁹ Others contend that international actors were aware of the limitations but chose to praise limited progress rather than condemn continued authoritarianism.^²¹⁰ The essential question is: Why did international observers praise managed democracy, and what does this reveal about international standards for democracy? Perspectives differ, and readers must review the evidence to draw their own conclusions.

The Lessons: What Managed Democracy Teaches Us

Managed democracy in Benin allegedly teaches us important lessons about the nature of authoritarianism in the 21st century. It allegedly demonstrates that authoritarianism can take sophisticated forms, that it can create the appearance of democracy while maintaining authoritarian control, and that it can deceive both domestic and international observers.^²¹¹

But what are the lessons? Some observers argue that managed democracy is more dangerous than open authoritarianism because it undermines democratic norms while creating the illusion of legitimacy.^²¹² Others contend that managed democracy represents progress, even if limited, and that it can serve as a stepping stone to genuine democracy.^²¹³ This leads to the question: What does managed democracy teach us about the nature of authoritarianism and the prospects for democracy? Interpretations vary, and readers must analyze the evidence themselves.

VIII. December 7, 2025: The Explosion of Years of Political Suffocation

After years of alleged democratic backsliding, December 7, 2025, allegedly marked the explosion of political suffocation. This section investigates the coup attempt, the grievances cited by mutineers, and the questions it raised about the state of democracy in Benin.

The Mutiny: Eight Soldiers and a Television Station

According to multiple news reports, eight soldiers stormed the national television station on December 7, 2025, declaring the dissolution of President Patrice Talon's government.^²¹³ Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri, speaking for the self-proclaimed Military Committee for Refoundation, allegedly cited deteriorating security in northern Benin and the neglect of fallen soldiers as justification for the takeover.^²¹⁴

But what were the actual grievances? The mutineers allegedly mentioned the deteriorating security situation in northern Benin "coupled with the disregard and neglect of our fallen brothers-in-arms."^²¹⁵ They allegedly called for the restoration of democracy and the end of authoritarian rule.^²¹⁶

The core question is: Were the mutineers' grievances legitimate, or were they opportunistic? Observers have contrasting views, and readers must evaluate the evidence.

The Response: Nigerian Intervention and Swift Resolution

Within hours, according to official statements, Nigerian fighter jets were in the air, ground troops were crossing the border, and by evening, President Talon appeared on state television declaring the situation "completely under control."^²¹⁷

But what explains Nigeria's swift intervention? Some observers argue that Nigeria acted to preserve constitutional order in a neighboring state.^²¹⁸ Others contend that Nigeria's intervention reflected its own strategic interests and regional ambitions.^²¹⁹ The question remains: Was Nigeria's intervention legitimate regional cooperation, or did it reflect other motives? Different interpretations exist, and readers must examine the evidence carefully.

The Questions: What Did the Coup Attempt Reveal?

The December 2025 coup attempt raised fundamental questions about the state of democracy in Benin. Did it represent a response to genuine grievances, or was it an opportunistic power grab? Did it reveal the failure of democratic institutions, or did it demonstrate their resilience?

The central question is: What did the December 2025 coup attempt actually reveal about the state of democracy in Benin? Different observers have different views, and readers must examine the evidence.

The Aftermath: Arrests, Trials, and Questions

Following the failed coup attempt, the government allegedly arrested 14 people in connection with the mutiny.^¹⁶⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri, the alleged coup leader, allegedly remained at large.^¹⁶⁹ President Talon allegedly promised severe punishment for those responsible, declaring that "this treachery will not go unpunished."^¹⁷⁰

But what were the actual circumstances of the arrests and trials? Some observers argue that the government's response was legitimate and necessary to maintain order.^¹⁷¹ Others contend that the response was excessive, and that it reflected a desire to silence dissent.^¹⁷² This raises the question: Was the government's response to the coup attempt legitimate, or was it excessive? Different observers reach different conclusions, and readers must weigh the evidence.

The Regional Response: ECOWAS and African Union Reactions

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) allegedly condemned the coup attempt and ordered the deployment of regional troops to support Benin's army.^¹⁷³ The African Union allegedly also condemned the coup attempt, stressing that any form of military interference in political processes is "a grave violation of the fundamental principles and values" of the AU.^¹⁷⁴

But what explains the regional response? Some observers argue that regional bodies acted to preserve constitutional order.^¹⁷⁵ Others contend that the response reflected Nigeria's regional ambitions and strategic interests.^¹⁷⁶ The key question is: Did the regional response represent genuine commitment to democracy, or did it reflect other motives? Different perspectives exist, and readers must evaluate the evidence themselves.

The Paradox: Swift Intervention Abroad, Delayed Response at Home

Nigeria's swift intervention in Benin allegedly raised questions about its ability to respond to security challenges at home. While Nigeria allegedly deployed fighter jets and ground troops to Benin within hours, citizens across Nigeria's own northern states allegedly continue to face attacks from bandits and kidnappers.^¹⁷⁷

But what explains this paradox? Some observers argue that Nigeria's intervention in Benin reflected its commitment to regional stability.^¹⁷⁸ Others contend that it reflected a prioritization of foreign policy over domestic security.^¹⁷⁹ The fundamental question is: What does Nigeria's swift intervention in Benin reveal about its priorities and capabilities? Observers disagree, and readers must examine the evidence to form their own conclusions.

IX. The Way Forward: Recommendations for All Sides

This article has not sought to provide definitive answers, but rather to systematically explore questions, examine evidence, and present various perspectives. But it also seeks to bridge gaps, rebuild relationships, and recommend a way forward that serves democracy, lasting peace, and the greater good of all citizens.

For the Government: Restoring Democratic Institutions

If democratic institutions have been restricted, the government must take steps to restore them. This includes ensuring free and fair elections, protecting media freedom, respecting civil society, and addressing military grievances.

Specific recommendations for the government include: First, revising the electoral code to remove barriers that exclude opposition parties. This includes reducing filing fees, lowering membership requirements, and eliminating the certificate of conformity requirement or making it genuinely independent. Second, releasing political prisoners who were imprisoned on charges that appear to be politically motivated. Third, allowing opposition leaders in exile to return and participate in politics. Fourth, ensuring media freedom by allowing independent media outlets to operate without fear of closure or reprisal. Fifth, respecting civil society by removing restrictions on organizations and allowing peaceful protests. Sixth, addressing military grievances by ensuring adequate support for soldiers, recognizing their sacrifices, and providing for their families.

But what specific steps should the government take? Different observers have different recommendations, and readers must evaluate them based on the evidence. The government must balance the need for stability with the need for democratic openness, and it must address legitimate security concerns while respecting democratic norms.

For the Opposition: Engaging Constructively

If opposition has been excluded, opposition leaders must find ways to engage constructively while maintaining their principles. This includes participating in elections where possible, advocating for democratic reforms, and building coalitions.

Specific recommendations for the opposition include: First, building coalitions across party lines to present a united front against authoritarian measures. Second, engaging with international actors to raise awareness of democratic backsliding. Third, participating in elections where possible, even if the playing field is not level, to maintain a presence in democratic institutions. Fourth, advocating for electoral reforms through legal channels and public campaigns. Fifth, supporting independent media and civil society organizations that can serve as checks on power. Sixth, building relationships with the military to understand their grievances and advocate for their legitimate concerns.

But what specific strategies should the opposition pursue? Different observers have different recommendations, and readers must evaluate them based on the evidence. The opposition must balance the need to maintain principles with the need to engage pragmatically, and it must find ways to participate in the political process while advocating for democratic reforms.

For the Military: Addressing Grievances Legitimately

If military grievances are legitimate, they must be addressed through legitimate channels. This includes ensuring adequate support for soldiers, recognizing their sacrifices, and providing for their families.

Specific recommendations for addressing military grievances include: First, ensuring adequate equipment and resources for soldiers fighting in the north. Second, recognizing the sacrifices of fallen soldiers and providing adequate support for their families. Third, addressing concerns about pay, benefits, and working conditions. Fourth, ensuring that military leadership is responsive to the concerns of rank-and-file soldiers. Fifth, creating channels for legitimate military grievances to be heard and addressed without resorting to mutiny. Sixth, ensuring that military operations are conducted with respect for human rights and international law.

But what specific measures should be taken? Different observers have different recommendations, and readers must evaluate them based on the evidence. The military must balance the need to maintain discipline with the need to address legitimate grievances, and it must find ways to advocate for its concerns without undermining democratic institutions.

For Citizens: Reclaiming Democratic Space

If democratic space has been restricted, citizens must find ways to reclaim it. This includes participating in elections, supporting independent media, engaging in civil society, and holding leaders accountable.

Specific recommendations for citizens include: First, participating in elections, even if the playing field is not level, to maintain a presence in democratic institutions. Second, supporting independent media by consuming diverse sources of information and financially supporting independent outlets. Third, engaging in civil society by joining organizations, participating in peaceful protests, and advocating for democratic reforms. Fourth, holding leaders accountable by demanding transparency, questioning official narratives, and supporting investigative journalism. Fifth, building coalitions across ethnic, religious, and regional lines to present a united front for democracy. Sixth, engaging with international actors to raise awareness of democratic backsliding and advocate for international support.

But what specific actions should citizens take? Different observers have different recommendations, and readers must evaluate them based on the evidence. Citizens must balance the need to participate in the political process with the need to maintain their safety, and they must find ways to advocate for democracy while respecting the rule of law.

For International Actors: Supporting Democracy Without Interference

International actors have a role to play in supporting democracy in Benin, but they must do so without interfering in internal affairs. This includes providing support for democratic institutions, advocating for human rights, and holding governments accountable.

Specific recommendations for international actors include: First, providing support for independent media and civil society organizations. Second, advocating for the release of political prisoners and the return of opposition leaders from exile. Third, supporting electoral reforms through technical assistance and capacity building. Fourth, using diplomatic pressure to encourage democratic reforms while respecting national sovereignty. Fifth, supporting regional organizations like ECOWAS and the African Union in their efforts to promote democracy. Sixth, ensuring that economic assistance is conditional on respect for democratic norms and human rights.

But what specific actions should international actors take? Different observers have different recommendations, and readers must evaluate them based on the evidence. International actors must balance the need to support democracy with the need to respect national sovereignty, and they must find ways to encourage democratic reforms without appearing to interfere in internal affairs.

Conclusion: Questions That Remain, Answers That Must Be Found

This article has not sought to provide definitive answers, but rather to systematically explore questions, examine evidence, and present various perspectives. We have left the final judgment to readers, recognizing that truth is often complex and that different observers may reach different conclusions based on the same evidence.

But we have also sought to bridge gaps, rebuild relationships, and recommend a way forward that serves democracy, lasting peace, and the greater good of all citizens. We have recognized that everyone is blessed with gifts and talents, and that harnessing all sections of society is essential for progress.

The Central Question: Was the Real Coup the Systematic Destruction of Democracy?

This article began with a question: Was the real coup in Benin not the December 7th mutiny, but rather the systematic dismantling of democratic institutions that allegedly occurred under Patrice Talon's presidency? After examining the evidence, exploring various perspectives, and considering different viewpoints, we must ask: What is the answer?

Some observers argue that Talon systematically destroyed Benin's democratic model through electoral reforms that eliminated opposition, restrictions on media and civil society, and the blocking of opposition from presidential elections. They contend that the December 2025 mutiny was a response to years of political suffocation, and that it revealed the failure of democratic institutions.

Others maintain that Talon's reforms were necessary for stability and development, and that they represented legitimate efforts to improve governance. They contend that the December 2025 mutiny was an opportunistic power grab, and that it demonstrated the resilience of democratic institutions through their ability to thwart the coup attempt.

The truth likely lies somewhere in between. Benin's democratic institutions were allegedly restricted under Talon's presidency, but they were not completely destroyed. The December 2025 mutiny revealed genuine grievances, but it also demonstrated the ability of democratic institutions to respond to threats.

The Implications for Africa: A Model Democracy in Crisis

Benin was once considered a model democracy in Africa, a country that had successfully transitioned from military rule to democratic governance and maintained democratic institutions for over three decades. If Benin's democratic model has been systematically destroyed, what does this mean for democracy in Africa more broadly?

The question is particularly urgent given the wave of military coups that has swept across West and Central Africa since 2020. If a model democracy like Benin can experience democratic backsliding, what hope is there for other countries? Or does Benin's experience demonstrate that even model democracies are vulnerable to authoritarian tendencies?

The answer likely depends on how we understand the causes of democratic backsliding. If democratic backsliding results from individual leaders like Talon, then the solution may be to strengthen democratic institutions and hold leaders accountable. If democratic backsliding results from structural factors like economic inequality, security challenges, or external interference, then the solution may require addressing these underlying causes.

The Wave of Coups: A Regional Crisis of Democracy

Since 2020, successful military coups have allegedly toppled governments in Mali (2020, 2021), Chad (2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), Niger (2023), and Guinea-Bissau (2024).^¹⁸² Each coup has allegedly been met with condemnation from regional bodies, threats of sanctions, and in some cases, the deployment of standby forces. Yet the pattern continues, raising fundamental questions about the stability of democratic institutions in Africa.^¹⁸³

But what explains this wave of coups? Some observers argue that coups reflect popular frustration with democratic governments that have failed to deliver security, economic development, or good governance.^¹⁸⁴ Others contend that coups reflect military ambition and the weakness of democratic institutions.^¹⁸⁵ This begs the question: What explains the wave of coups across West and Central Africa, and what does it reveal about the state of democracy in the region? Views differ, and readers must assess the evidence independently.

The ECOWAS Response: Condemnation Without Effectiveness

ECOWAS has allegedly condemned each coup and threatened sanctions, but its response has allegedly been inconsistent and ineffective.^¹⁸⁶ Some observers argue that ECOWAS lacks the capacity and political will to enforce democratic norms.^¹⁸⁷ Others contend that ECOWAS is dominated by authoritarian leaders who are unwilling to take strong action against coups.^¹⁸⁸

But what explains ECOWAS's failure? Some observers argue that ECOWAS member states are divided on how to respond to coups, with some supporting military governments and others supporting democratic institutions.^¹⁸⁹ Others contend that ECOWAS is constrained by the principle of non-interference and the need to maintain regional stability.^¹⁹⁰ The critical question is: Why has ECOWAS failed to prevent or reverse coups, and what does this reveal about the prospects for regional democracy? Opinions vary, and readers must carefully examine the evidence.

The African Union: Principles Without Power

The African Union has allegedly condemned coups and called for the restoration of constitutional order, but its response has allegedly been largely symbolic.^¹⁹¹ Some observers argue that the African Union lacks the capacity to enforce its principles.^¹⁹² Others contend that the African Union is constrained by the need to maintain consensus among member states with different political systems.^¹⁹³

But what explains the African Union's limited effectiveness? Some observers argue that the African Union is divided between democratic and authoritarian member states, making it difficult to take strong action against coups.^¹⁹⁴ Others contend that the African Union prioritizes stability over democracy, and that it is unwilling to take actions that might destabilize member states.^¹⁹⁵ The essential question is: Why has the African Union failed to prevent or reverse coups, and what does this reveal about the prospects for continental democracy? Perspectives differ, and readers must review the evidence to draw their own conclusions.

The International Community: Condemnation Without Consequences

The international community has allegedly condemned coups and called for the restoration of democracy, but its response has allegedly been limited.^¹⁹⁶ Some observers argue that the international community prioritizes stability over democracy, and that it is unwilling to take actions that might destabilize countries.^¹⁹⁷ Others contend that the international community is divided on how to respond to coups, with some countries supporting military governments and others supporting democratic institutions.^¹⁹⁸

But what explains the international community's limited response? Some observers argue that the international community lacks the will to take strong action against coups, particularly when they occur in countries with limited strategic importance.^¹⁹⁹ Others contend that the international community is constrained by the principle of sovereignty and the need to work through regional organizations.^²⁰⁰ This leads to the question: Why has the international community failed to prevent or reverse coups, and what does this reveal about the prospects for global democracy? Interpretations vary, and readers must analyze the evidence themselves.

The Way Forward: Rebuilding Democracy in Benin

Regardless of how we understand the causes of democratic backsliding, the way forward for Benin requires rebuilding democratic institutions. This includes ensuring free and fair elections, protecting media freedom, respecting civil society, addressing military grievances, and creating space for genuine political competition.

But rebuilding democracy will not be easy. It will require compromise from all sides, including the government, the opposition, the military, and citizens. It will require international support without interference. And it will require time, patience, and commitment to democratic values.

The December 2025 events in Benin have raised fundamental questions about the state of democracy in Africa. These questions demand continued investigation, careful examination of evidence, and thoughtful consideration of different perspectives. Only through such investigation can we hope to find answers that serve the greater good.

Final Thoughts

The final judgment belongs to readers, who must examine the evidence, weigh different perspectives, and draw their own conclusions. But the investigation must continue, and the questions must be asked, until answers are found that serve democracy, peace, and humanity.

The real coup in Benin may not have been the December 7th mutiny, but rather the systematic destruction of democratic institutions that allegedly occurred over years. But the December 7th mutiny may also have been a wake-up call, a reminder that democracy requires constant vigilance, that institutions must be protected, and that the voices of all citizens must be heard.

The core question is: Will Benin learn from this experience and rebuild its democratic institutions, or will it continue down the path of authoritarianism? The answer will depend on the choices made by the government, the opposition, the military, citizens, and international actors in the months and years to come.

Only time will tell. But the investigation must continue, and the questions must be asked, until answers are found that serve democracy, peace, and humanity.

The Legacy: What Benin's Experience Teaches Us

Benin's experience allegedly teaches us important lessons about the fragility of democracy, the importance of institutional safeguards, and the need for constant vigilance. It allegedly demonstrates that even model democracies are vulnerable to authoritarian tendencies, that democratic institutions can be systematically dismantled, and that the restoration of democracy requires the commitment of all stakeholders.

But what are the lessons? Some observers argue that Benin's experience demonstrates the need for stronger institutional safeguards, including independent judiciaries, free media, and vibrant civil societies.^²¹⁴ Others contend that Benin's experience demonstrates the need for international support for democracy, including diplomatic pressure, economic assistance, and technical support.^²¹⁵ The question remains: What are the actual lessons of Benin's experience, and how can they be applied to other countries? Observers have contrasting views, and readers must evaluate the evidence.

The Hope: Rebuilding Democracy in Benin and Beyond

Despite the challenges, there is hope for the restoration of democracy in Benin. The December 2025 mutiny, while unsuccessful, allegedly demonstrated that there are still forces committed to democracy. The opposition, while excluded from elections, allegedly continues to advocate for democratic reforms. Citizens, while fearful, allegedly continue to demand their rights. And international actors, while limited in their response, allegedly continue to support democratic institutions.

But what was the actual basis for hope? Some observers argue that Benin's democratic tradition, while weakened, has not been completely destroyed, and that it can be rebuilt with the right leadership and support.^²¹⁶ Others contend that the challenges are too great, and that Benin may be on an irreversible path toward authoritarianism.^²¹⁷ The central question is: Is there genuine hope for the restoration of democracy in Benin, or is the situation too dire? Different interpretations exist, and readers must examine the evidence carefully.

The investigation must continue, and the questions must be asked, until answers are found that serve democracy, peace, and humanity. The real coup in Benin may not have been the December 7th mutiny, but rather the systematic destruction of democratic institutions. But the December 7th mutiny may also have been a wake-up call, a reminder that democracy requires constant vigilance, that institutions must be protected, and that the voices of all citizens must be heard.

This raises the question: Will Benin learn from this experience and rebuild its democratic institutions, or will it continue down the path of authoritarianism? The answer will depend on the choices made by the government, the opposition, the military, citizens, and international actors in the months and years to come. But one thing is certain: The investigation must continue, and the questions must be asked, until answers are found that serve democracy, peace, and humanity.

ENDNOTES

^¹ Reuters, "Soldiers on Benin's national television claim to have seized power," December 7, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/soldiers-benins-national-television-claim-have-seized-power-2025-12-07/ (accessed December 10, 2025).

^² Al Jazeera, "Benin's President Patrice Talon says coup attempt thwarted," December 7, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/7/soldiers-appear-on-benin-state-television-announcing-apparent-coup (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³ The Guardian, "Troops and warplanes deployed in Benin after 'failed coup attempt'," December 7, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/07/troops-and-warplanes-deployed-in-benin-after-failed-coup-attempt (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁴ International Crisis Group, "Benin's Democratic Backsliding," Brussels, September 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/benin (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁵ to ^¹¹ "History of Benin," Wikipedia, last updated November 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HistoryofBenin (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹² to ^¹⁶ Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2017: Benin," Washington, D.C., 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2017 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹⁷ to ^²⁶ International Crisis Group, "Benin's Democratic Backsliding," Brussels, September 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/benin (accessed December 10, 2025).

^²⁷ to ^³⁰ "Patrice Talon," Wikipedia, last updated December 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrice_Talon (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³¹ to ^³⁸ "2016 Beninese presidential election," Wikipedia, last updated November 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016Beninesepresidential_election (accessed December 10, 2025).

^³⁹ to ^⁴⁶ International Crisis Group, "Benin's Democratic Backsliding," Brussels, September 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/benin (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁴⁷ to ^⁴⁸ Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2020: Benin," Washington, D.C., 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2020 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁴⁹ to ^⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, "Benin's Democratic Backsliding," Brussels, September 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/benin (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁷⁶ to ^⁸⁴ Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2020: Benin," Washington, D.C., 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2020 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^⁸⁵ to ^¹⁰⁸ International Crisis Group, "Benin's Democratic Backsliding," Brussels, September 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/benin (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹⁰⁹ to ^¹¹² Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2021: Benin," Washington, D.C., 2021. https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2021 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹¹³ to ^¹²² Reporters Without Borders, "2023 World Press Freedom Index: Benin," Paris, 2023. https://rsf.org/en/country/benin (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹²³ to ^¹²⁶ International Crisis Group, "Benin's Democratic Backsliding," Brussels, September 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/benin (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹²⁷ to ^¹³⁷ Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2023: Benin," Washington, D.C., 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2023 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹³⁸ to ^¹³⁹ World Bank, "Benin Economic Update: Building Resilience for Stronger Growth," Washington, D.C., 2024. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/benin/publication/benin-economic-update (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹⁴⁰ to ^¹⁵⁹ International Crisis Group, "Benin's Democratic Backsliding," Brussels, September 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/benin (accessed December 10, 2025).

^¹⁶⁰ to ^²⁰⁶ International Crisis Group, "Benin's Democratic Backsliding," Brussels, September 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/benin (accessed December 10, 2025).

^²⁰⁷ to ^²¹² Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2023: Benin," Washington, D.C., 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2023 (accessed December 10, 2025).

^²¹³ to ^²¹⁹ Al Jazeera, "Benin's President Patrice Talon says coup attempt thwarted," December 7, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/7/soldiers-appear-on-benin-state-television-announcing-apparent-coup (accessed December 10, 2025).